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This dissertation consists of three independent essays. We briefly introduce these essays
in chapter 1 and leave a comprehensive introduction to each essay. Chapter 2 considers
a vertically separated industry where production takes time and vertical mergers shorten
production time. We investigate the impact of vertical mergers on the downstream firms’
ability to collude and show that vertical mergers facilitate downstream collusion. Chapter
3 provides a theoretical foundation for a puzzling empirical observation that advertising
follows an inverted U shape for some new products. Chapter 4 analyzes an incumbent’s
response to a competitive entry. We show that if the quality of the entrant is uncertain, the
incumbent can “jam” the quality signalling of the entrant. Finally, chapter 5 summarizes
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Chapter 2 analyzes the effect of a vertical merger on downstream collusion when vertically
integrated firms have shorter production lags. Vertical integration is pro-competitive and
not profitable if firms behave competitively. However, we show that vertical integration
facilitates collusion, in which case it is profitable.
In chapter 3, a monopolist introduces a new product of either low or high quality. It
advertises to make consumers aware of the product and signals product quality using both
price and advertising. When consumption does not reveal product quality, price is higher
and advertising is lower than they would be if product quality is observable. Price rises and
advertising falls as the fraction of aware consumers increases. When consumption reveals
product quality, price is higher and advertising is lower than they would be if product
quality is observable. Price declines as the fraction of aware consumers increases and
advertising follows an inverted U shape. We find support for these empirical predictions
from a data set on Direct-to-Consumer advertising on pharmaceutical drugs.
Chapter 4 considers an industry in which a monopolist incumbent with known
quality faces a competitive entry. When the quality of the entrant is certain, we show
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that the income distribution of consumers and the quality difference between the entrant
and the incumbent determine whether the entrant can secure a positive market share or
not. When the quality of the entrant is uncertain, we show that the incumbent and the
entrant have opposing strategic incentives. While a high quality entrant wants to signal
its quality to consumers, the incumbent wants to prevent this signalling attempt. Under
certain parametric values, we show that by increasing its own price, the incumbent not




Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate
Downstream Collusion?
2.1 Introduction
The growing number of cases of collusion involves downstream industries in which inter-
mediate goods are used as an input in production.1 In most of these industries, since
production of intermediate goods is time-consuming, advanced order is often necessary.
Vertical integrations are observed in a significant portion of those collusive industries.2
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of a vertical merger in a vertically
separated industry in which input production takes time, and hence has to be ordered in
advance. More specifically, we focus on the effect of a vertical merger on collusion among
1See Naughton (2004) describes some alleged abuse of monopsony power in intermediate good markets
such as cattle (Pickett v. Tyson Fresh Meats, inc.), tobacco (Deloach v.Philip Morris), and timber (
Washington Alder LLC v. Weyerhaeuser Co.). Similarly, Tosdal (1917) describes German steel cartel and
Hendricks, Porter, and Tan (2000) analyze the joint bidding for oil and gas tracks.
2As an example, Tyson, ConAgra Beef Companies, Cargill, Smithfield,and Farmland National Beef
Corporation, control 70 percent of beef packing industry and they also participate in livestock production
through vertical integrations. The cartel in German Steel Industry before WWI and the bromine cartel in
the US Levinstein (1997) also feature vertical mergers.
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downstream firms. We raise the relevant question of whether or not a vertical merger
facilitates downstream collusion.
Vertical mergers in particular and vertical restraints in general were considered as
most likely to be pro-competitive or neutral by Chicago School and antitrust authorities
during the 1970’s and 1980’s, Robert H. Bork (1978) due to their potential efficiency en-
hancing effects such as eliminating the double-markup problem and improving supply chain
management. Recently, however, academics and anti-trust authorities have challenged this
conclusion on the ground that vertical mergers could be anti-competitive by raising rival’s
costs and facilitating collusion.
Many intermediate goods industries experience an order-to-delivery lag, because or-
der management, production, and delivery take time. For example, in the apparel industry
the order-to-deliver lag averages 9 months while it averages only 42 days in the poultry
meat industry. Vertical mergers can shorten this lag dramatically by improving coordi-
nation and management between upstream and downstream firms. For example, Zara, a
famous Spanish apparel maker, is vertically integrated and its production and distribution
needs only two weeks to get a product to its stores, rather than the nine-month industry
average.3
We consider an industry in which, in each period, upstream firms produce a per-
fectly homogeneous intermediate good at a constant uniform marginal cost and announce
a unit price. Then downstream firms place their quantity orders, which are observable and
take time to produce and deliver. At the time of delivery, downstream firms make their
payments and transform it into a perfectly homogenous final good and then compete in
quantities to supply to the downstream market. Both upstream and downstream firms re-
peat this interaction forever. We focus on the stationary collusive equilibrium in which the
3See Richardson’s (1996) description of vertical mergers and rapid response in apparel industry.
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downstream firms form an all-inclusive cartel, maximizing joint profits, and using reversion
to the static Nash equilibrium forever, Friedman (1971) to punish any deviation from the
monopoly outcome. The cartel’s ability to collude is measured by the minimum discount
factor above which this monopoly outcome is sustainable for each cartel member. We say
vertical merger facilitates collusion if it reduces this critical discount factor.
We first consider a vertically separated industry where upstream and downstream
firms are separated. First notice that advanced quantity orders of intermediate goods need
to be done before the downstream market opens, and there is no way downstream firms
can reverse their orders and input cost is sunk. Hence quantity orders carry a commitment
value for downstream firms. Moreover, the amount that a downstream firm orders in a
period determines the maximum amount that it can supply to the market in that period.
As a result, in the case of a downstream collusion, the only way to deviate for a disloyal
cartel member is to order more than its assigned monopoly share at the order stage. This
deviation attempt is observable, but cannot be responded to in that period.
We now consider the impact of a vertical merger between one of the downstream
firms and an upstream firm on collusion. We assume that a vertically integrated firm can
process its own orders more rapidly. In other words, the order-to-delivery lag for within-
firm orders is shorter than the order-to-delivery lag between firms. Also, realize that
intra-firm orders have no commitment value because the integrated entity can reverse the
cost of input orders through better coordination with its upstream affiliate: hence, input
cost is not sunk. Resulting from the lack of pre-commitment, the unintegrated firm makes
its quantity commitment before the integrated firm; hence, in the punishment phase the
unintegrated firm, the ‘(Stackelberg) leader’, can exercise a preemptive advantage over the
integrated firm, the ‘(Stackelberg) follower’. In other words, in vertically related industries
with order-to-delivery lags, a vertical merger is not profitable if firms behave competitively.
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The asymmetry between intra-firm and inter-firm orders has two effects on the
ability of downstream firms to collude. A vertically merged firm can punish any deviation
by a downstream firm within the same period, thereby eliminating any incentive for that
firm to deviate. We call this effect of a vertical merger the quick response effect. The
possibility for collusion then depends upon the vertically integrated firm’s incentive to
deviate. Its one period gain from deviating is the same as it was when the firm is not
vertically integrated. However, the downstream firm’s ability to punish a deviation by the
vertically integrated firm is greater than it is when the firm is not vertically integrated. The
vertically integrated firm’s payoff during the punishment phase is lower than it is when the
firm is not vertically integrated. We call this effect of a vertical merger the lack of quantity
precommitment effect. Both effects work towards making collusion more likely; hence we
conclude that in vertically related industries with order-to-delivery lags, a vertical merger
facilitates collusion, which is profitable.
To our knowledge, the closest related article in the literature is Nocke and White
(2005) in which they focus on the impact of vertical merger on upstream collusion in
vertically related industries. In our model, downstream firms first order their input, then
transform it and compete to sell to consumers. Hence, the input orders are sunk and carry
a commitment power. In other words, downstream firms can use input orders as a strategic
decision variable to improve their payoff in competition. In their setup, downstream firms
first compete to sell the final product then start ordering inputs to produce it. Hence,
downstream firms’ orders have no commitment power. In fact, Nocke and White’s and our
papers focus on different vertically related industries.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In section 2, we outline the baseline
model. In section 3, we analyze the equilibrium and the impact of vertical merger on
downstream collusion with only two retailers. Section 4 provides an extension of the model
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where we investigate the impact of a vertical merger on collusion with a more competitive
downstream industry. Section 5 concludes the article.
2.2 Model
There are n ≥ 2 upstream firms producing a perfectly homogeneous intermediate good at
a constant uniform marginal cost, c. There are m ≥ 2 buyers in the intermediate good
market who compete against each other in a downstream market. Each of the downstream
firms uses the same technology for transforming one unit of intermediate good into one
unit of homogenous final output and does so at a constant per unit cost. For simplicity,
production cost of downstream firms is normalized to zero. Time is discrete and there is





where P is the final good market price and qj (j = 1, ...,m) is the amount that downstream
j supplies to the market.
The timing of the game in each period is as follows:
1. Contract offer stage:
Upstream firms simultaneously post wholesale prices.
2. Order stage:
Downstream firms simultaneously place their orders with upstream firms.
3. Competition stage:
Downstream firms receive their orders at the end of the period, make their payments and
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decide how much quantity to supply to the downstream market.
The orders are assumed to be publicly observable and take time to process. There-
fore, the amount that a firm orders in a period determines the maximum amount that it
can supply to the market in that period. The future payoffs are discounted by the same
discount factor δ for all the firms. Each firm maximizes the present value of the sum of
the infinite sequence of one-period stage game payoffs.
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis: Two Downstream Firms
In this section, we analyze the impact of a vertical merger on downstream collusion when
there are only two downstream firms and upstream firms behave competitively. We extend
the analysis to m firms in a later section. The solution concept is subgame perfect. We
focus on the stationary collusive equilibrium in which the downstream firms form an all-
inclusive cartel, maximize joint profits, and use reversion to the static Nash equilibrium
forever, Friedman (1971) to punish any deviation from the monopoly outcome.4 Although
deviation may be profitable for a period, the continuation profits will be lower. The tradeoff
depends on the discount factor. There is a critical discount factor below which each cartel
member prefers the short-run gain against the long-term loss, Tirole (1989). The highest
critical discount factor among the members of the cartel is defined as the critical discount
factor for the cartel.
In order to analyze the impact of a vertical merger on the collusion, we first calculate
the critical discount factor in a vertically separated market. This is a market with no
vertically integrated firm. Then, we compare this critical discount factor with the critical
discount factor when one of the downstream firms merges with an upstream firm. If the
latter is smaller than the former, we conclude that the vertical merger facilitates collusion.
4Renegotiation and side payments are not possible.
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2.3.1 Vertically Separated Industries
Non-Collusive Equilibrium
Since upstream firms are assumed to compete in price and downstream firms only
buy from the cheapest supplier, in any subgame perfect equilibrium, upstream firms post
wholesale prices equal to marginal cost c. This is the standard undercutting logic of
Bertrand equilibrium.
Lemma 1. The static Nash equilibrium is the Cournot equilibrium.
In the equilibrium each downstream firm purchases (a− c)/3 in the order stage and






where the superscript C stands for Cournot. Repeated play of the static Nash equilibrium
is a subgame perfect equilibrium in the repeated game.
Collusive Equilibrium
In the collusive equilibrium, downstream firms set quantities so that total supply in
the downstream market is at the monopoly level. To implement the monopoly outcome,
downstream firms have to share the monopolistic quantity. Let αj denote the market share





where the superscript M denotes monopoly.
As Scherer (1990) notes, “the very act of fixing the price at a monopolistic level
creates incentives for sellers to expand output beyond the quantity that will sustain the
9
agreed-upon price”(p. 244). Profits from a deviation depend on the sharing rule of the
collusive agreement. The most profitable deviation for downstream firm j is to purchase












Solving for the optimal order and substituting this quantity into the firm’s profits yields
ΠDj =
(1 + αj)2(a− c)2
16
,
where the superscript D refers to deviation. The deviation will trigger the infinite reversion







Each downstream firm is willing to collude if its discounted present value of collusive
profit is bigger than its deviation profit plus discounted present value of its profit in the
punishment phase. The range of discount factors in which downstream firm j has no
incentive to deviate can be written as follows




9(1 + αj)2 − 36αj
9(1 + αj)2 − 16
.
Here δj denotes downstream firm j’s critical discount factor.
The cartel is sustainable if and only if neither downstream firm has an incentive to
deviate, that is if, and only if,
δ ≥ δ ≡ max{δ1, δ2}.
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We are interested in determining the lowest value for the critical discount factor δ. Since
δj is decreasing in αj , symmetry implies that equal sharing minimizes the critical discount
factor for the cartel. Plugging this solution into the above equation yields the following
lemma.
Lemma 2. In a vertically separated market, δ = 917 is the minimum critical discount
factor that sustains downstream collusion.
2.3.2 Vertically Related Industries
We now consider the case in which one of the downstream firms, say firm 1, has merged
with an upstream firm. We assume that a vertically integrated firm can process its own
orders more rapidly. In other words, the order lag for within-firm orders is shorter than
the order lag between firms.
Non-collusive Equilibrium
The vertically integrated firm has two kinds of order strategies. It can order input
from another independent upstream firm or it can order from itself. If the vertically
integrated firm places an order with an independent upstream firm, then it is committed to
that order. Thus, one subgame perfect equilibrium to the stage game consists of both firms
ordering the Cournot quantities from upstream firms. Given these orders, the vertically
integrated firm has no incentive to order additional quantity from itself. However, there is
another subgame perfect equilibrium in which the vertically integrated firm supplies itself.
In this equilibrium, the downstream firm (firm 2) gets to commit to a quantity before the
vertically integrated firm. The equilibrium in this case is the Stackelberg equilibrium. In
what follows, we will focus on the Stackelberg equilibrium. The justification for doing so
is that if costs of filling within-firm orders are slightly less than c, the cost of buying from
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another upstream firm, then the vertically integrated firm’s best reply to the other firm’s
choice of the Cournot quantity is always to order the Cournot quantity from itself rather
than from an upstream competitor.
The following lemma characterizes the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Lemma 3. The downstream firm 2’s equilibrium profit is ΠS2 = (a− c)2/8 and the verti-
cally integrated firm’s equilibrium profit is ΠS1 = (a− c)2/16.
The existence of production lags is the main characteristics of this model, which
derives this equilibrium. Since production takes time, the unintegrated firm gains the first
mover advantage through quantity orders. However, as a second mover, the integrated firm
produces its inputs before the production period starts due to production lag. 5
As before, repeated play of the static Nash equilibrium is a subgame perfect equi-
librium to the repeated game.
In the Stackelberg equilibrium, downstream firm 2’s profits exceed the profits of the
vertically integrated firm. The vertically integrated firms’s inability to commit to an order
at the same time as its downstream rival means that the latter can afford to order more
than the Cournot quantity knowing that the vertically integrated firm’s best response is
to order less than the Cournot quantity.
Collusive Equilibrium
When can the vertically integrated firm and the downstream firm collude on the
monopoly outcome in each period? Suppose the vertically integrated firm’s share of the
5It can be also shown that if the input production is instantaneous, it is optimal for the integrated
firm to produce its input before competition takes place. Indeed, in the equilibrium the integrated firm
produces instantaneously at the order stage. That takes away the first mover advantage of unintegrated
firm, resulting in the Cournot equilibrium.
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monopoly output is α1 and the downstream firm share is α2 = 1 − α1. Then vertically
integrated firm’s profits in each period are
ΠM1 = α1(a− c)2/4
and the downstream firm’s profits in each period are
ΠM2 = α2(a− c)2/4.
The downstream firm cannot respond to any deviation by the vertically integrated
firm. Therefore, the optimal deviation for the vertically integrated firm is the same as it
was when it was not vertically integrated. Recall that profits from that deviation are
ΠD1 = (1 + αj)
2(a− c)2/16.
On the other hand, when the downstream firm deviates from its share of the monopoly
output, the vertically integrated firm can respond within the same period. Hence, the










⇔ ΠM2 > ΠS2 .
This result follows from the fact that ΠD2 = Π
S
2 . Thus, the downstream firm has no incentive
to deviate if its share of the monopoly profits exceeds its Stackelberg payoff. This result is
independent of the discount factor, which implies that δ2 = 0.
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which does depend upon the discount factor. Thus, the critical discount factor for the
cartel is determined by the critical discount factor of the vertically integrated firm. The
critical discount factor of the vertically integrated firm reduces to
δ ≥ δ1 ≡
(1 + α1)2 − 4α1
(1 + α1)2 − 1
The vertically integrated firm’s critical discount factor is decreasing in α1. Hence,





Substituting share values in the corresponding equation for the vertically integrated
firm’s critical discount factor leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 4. The critical discount factor with single vertical merger is δI = 15 .
Since the critical discount factor for the cartel in a vertically separated market is
9
17 , we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1. In a vertically separated market with two downstream firms, a vertical
merger facilitates downstream collusion.
The intuition for the result is as follows. A vertically merged firm can punish any
deviation by a downstream firm within the same period, thereby eliminating any incentive
for that firm to deviate. We call this effect of a vertical merger the quick response effect.
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The possibility for collusion then depends upon the vertically integrated firm’s incentive
to deviate. Its one period gain from deviating is the same as it was when the firm is not
vertically integrated. However, the downstream firm’s ability to punish a deviation by the
vertically integrated firm is greater than it was when the firm is not vertically integrated.
The vertically integrated firm’s payoff during the punishment phase is ΠS1 < Π
C . We call
this effect of a vertical merger the lack of quantity precommitment effect. Both effects work
towards making collusion more likely.
It is easy to observe that these effects are only relevant in vertically related in-
dustries with order-to-delivery lags. If the lag for intra-firm orders is the same as for
inter-firm orders, then vertical integration has no impact on the ability of firms to collude
in the downstream markets. Moreover, the observability of orders or alternatively credible
announcement of orders is crucial for these effects to be relevant. Therefore, the main
prediction of the model is that when orders are observable, we would expect to observe
more vertical mergers in the industries with order-to-delivery lags compared to the ones
without order-to-delivery lags.
An important result of this section is that if the market were competitive, we would
not see a vertical merger, because it is not profitable. However, If downstream firms are
colluding, we expect to see a vertical merger, because it facilitates collusion, in which
case it is profitable. Another interesting point to note is that vertical merger does not
lead to counter merger by the unintegrated downstream rival. If downstream firms behave
competitively, the unintegrated firm receives ‘(Stackelberg) leader’ profit by staying unin-
tegrated while it receives only Cournot profit by integrating due to the “lack of quantity
pre-commitment effect”. Moreover, If both downstream firms are integrated, they both
produce internally and end up being symmetric Cournot competitors with unobservable
orders, which hinders collusion.
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We can conclude that a vertical merger could be an evidence that collusion is ac-
tually taking place. Therefore, in vertically related industries with observable orders and
order-to-delivery lags, whether there is a vertical merger or not could be a test of collusion
for antitrust authorities.
2.4 Extension
2.4.1 Equilibrium Analysis: Many Downstream Firms
In this section, we analyze a model with more than two retailers to check whether facili-
tating collusion property of vertical merger still holds in a more competitive retail industry.
No-Vertical Merger
Most of the analysis is similar to the case with two retailers; hence, we give the results
for similar parts without elaborating on details. Let’s say there are m downstream firms
and n≥ 2 input producers . If firms behave competitively, the equilibrium profit for a





To implement the monopoly outcome, downstream firms have to share monopolistic
quantity. In the vertically separated industry, all downstream firms are symmetric. We
know that the minimum critical discount factor can be achieved by sharing monopolistic






The only way of deviation for a downstream firm is to purchase more than its





Since downstream firms are symmetric, the cartel’s critical discount factor can be







The minimum discount factor above which downstream firms can successfully col-
lude can be written as follows
δ =
(m+ 1)2
(m+ 1)2 + 4m
.
Lemma 5. A decrease in the number of downstream firms facilitates collusion.
On the contrary, perfectly competitive downstream market makes it impossible to
collude, i.e., as m→∞, δ → 1.
Single Vertical Merger
Non-collusive Equilibrium:The following lemma summarizes the profits of integrated and
unintegrated retailers








In fact, this lemma presents an extended version of lemma 3 in which m = 2.
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We now introduce the following notation. The integrated firm receives α1 while each
downstream firms receives α2 where α1 +(m−1)α2 = 1. Now we can specify the integrated
firm’s profit as ΠM1 = α1(a− c)2/4 and the unintegrated firm’s as ΠM2 = α2(a− c)2/4.








Proposition 2. In a vertically separated market with many downstream firms, a vertical
merger facilitates downstream collusion.
The result that a vertical merger in industries with production lag facilities collusion
also arises with an oligopolistic downstream market. This gives an additional motive for
anti-trust authorities to scrutinize this type of industry.
Do further mergers also facilitate collusion? Since the market share of the first
integrated firm is higher than the other unintegrated firms, initially there is a market share
motive among other firms for further integration. However, as the number of integrations
increases the symmetry among downstream firms, it starts hindering downstream collusion.
For example, if all firms but one are integrated, then the last possible integration will make
the market completely symmetric and the critical discount which sustains collusion will
be equal to the one in complete vertical separation. In summary, we can conclude that
there is a certain amount of integration above which further integration hinders collusion
and thus we expect to see an intermediate number of vertical mergers in vertically related
industries with order-to-delivery lags.
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Chapter 3
The Dynamics of Price and
Advertising as Signals of Quality
3.1 Introduction
When a firm introduces a new product, it advertises to make consumers aware of the prod-
uct and signals product quality using both price and advertising. Over time, as information
about the product diffuses, more and more consumers become aware of the product. This
paper examines the impact of increasing product awareness on advertising and on price.
We study this issue in a static model under two kinds of information environments. For
products like fire alarms and hair loss drugs, product quality is not easily verified since
consumption is a highly imperfect signal of product quality. In these cases, consumers who
are aware of the product remain uninformed about product quality. Hence, the value of
signaling increases as more consumers become aware of the product. For other products
like anti-histamine drugs and CD players, consumption reveals product quality. In these
cases, there are likely to be three kinds of consumers: informed consumers who are aware
19
of the product and know its quality, uninformed consumers who are aware of the product
but do not know its quality, and unaware consumers who do not know about the product.
We model this situation by assuming that consumers who are aware of the product at the
beginning of the period are informed, but consumers who learn about the product from
advertising during the period are uninformed. In this case, the value of signaling declines
as more consumers become aware of the product and are informed.
In characterizing the predictions of the signaling model, we focus on the unique
separating equilibrium that survives the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). In
most cases, this is also the unique equilibrium. Our main findings are as follows. When
product awareness does not lead to knowledge of product quality, price is higher and ad-
vertising is lower than they would be if product quality is observable and, as the fraction
of aware consumers increases, price rises and advertising decreases. Thus, the distortion
on price gets larger and the distortion on advertising gets smaller. When awareness leads
to knowledge of product quality, price is higher and advertising is lower than they would
be if product quality is observable. As the fraction of aware consumers increases, price
declines and advertising follows an inverted U shape. Thus, the distortion on both price
and advertising decreases as more consumers become aware and informed. We find sup-
port for these empirical implications from a data set on Direct-to-Consumer advertising
on pharmaceutical drugs. After being approved by the FDA in December 1997, annual
advertising for the hair loss prescription drug, Propecia, declined over the period 1998 to
2002. On the other hand, annual advertising for Singulair, an allergy prescription drug,
over the same period follows an inverted U shape.
There is a voluminous theoretical literature on price and/or advertising as signals
of product quality. The seminal paper is by Nelson (1974) and an excellent review of the
literature can be found in Bagwell (2005). Cooper and Ross (1984), Bagwell and Riordan
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(1991), and Linnemer (2002) study signaling models in which all consumers are aware of
the product but not all are informed about the quality of the product. Consequently,
advertising can signal but not inform. Bagwell and Riordan show that the high quality
firm will distort price upward and that the price will decline with the fraction of informed
consumers. Linnemer allows the firm to use advertising as well as price to signal quality
and characterizes conditions under which the firm will engage in dissipative advertising.
He argues that advertising is zero during introductory and mature phases of the product
cycle, but positive during the expansion phase. Our main contribution to this strand of the
literature is to give advertising a positive role in making consumers aware of the product
and to examine how price and advertising will change as more consumer become aware of
the product.
Overgaard (1991), Zhao (2000), Orzach et al. (2002), and Bagwell and Overgaard
(2005) study signaling models in which advertising enhances demand but product quality
is not observable. In the language of this paper, advertising makes consumers aware of
the product but they remain uninformed. These papers show that the high quality firm
will distort price upward and advertising downward relative to the case in which product
quality is observable. Our contribution to this literature is the comparative static result
that price increases and advertising decreases with the fraction of aware consumers.
The empirical literature on advertising and product quality has failed to find a
consistent relationship. The correlation between quality and advertising varies not only
across different markets and products but also across time. For example, Caves and Green
(1996) find that the quality-advertising correlation is generally weak in the early ages of
the product, but it becomes stronger as the product matures. Horstmann and MacDonald
(2003) study data on advertising and price from the compact disc player market. They find
that price falls at an accelerating pace and that advertising exhibits an inverted U shape.
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They were not able to reconcile these results with existing signaling models. However,
the results are consistent with the model developed in this paper under the assumption
that some of the consumers who are aware of the product are also informed, and that the
fraction of informed consumers grows over time.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic model. In
Section 3, we study product markets in which consumers may and may not be aware of
the product but are never informed about product quality. We characterize the separating
equilibrium and obtain closed form solutions for advertising and price as functions of the
fraction of aware consumers. In Section 4, we study product markets in which consumers
who are aware of the product may also be informed about product quality. We charac-
terize the separating equilibrium and solve for the solution numerically. In section 5, we
document several advertising patterns for prescription drugs. Section 6 provides some con-
cluding remarks, while the proofs are collected in the Appendix.
3.2 The Model
A monopolist manufactures a new product of uncertain quality. For simplicity, we will
assume that product quality is either high or low: q ∈ {H,L}, H > L. Let ρ0 denote the
ex ante probability of high quality. The monopolist knows product quality. Production
costs of the high (low) quality product are constant and equal to cH (cL). We impose the
following assumptions on product costs and quality: (i) cH > cL and (ii) cH/H < cL/L.
Condition (i) states that high quality product is more costly to produce and condition (ii)
implies that cost per unit of quality is lower for the high quality product.
There is a continuum of consumers for the new product, each with a potential
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demand for one unit. A consumer’s utility for a product of quality q is given by
u(q, p) = θq − p
where p is the price of the product. Consumers are differentiated in their willingness to
pay which is modeled by assuming θ is uniformly distributed on [0, R]. All consumers are
willing to pay more for the higher quality good.
Some consumers are aware of the product while others are not. Let λ denote the
fraction of consumers who are not aware of the product at the beginning of a period.
The monopolist can increase the fraction of consumers who are aware of the product by
advertising during a period. The probability of an unaware consumer learning about the
product from advertising is given by a/(1 + a) where a denotes advertising expenditures.




In what follows, we distinguish two kinds of product markets. In the first case, we
assume consumers who are aware of the product do not know its quality. This situation
would apply to a product whose quality is not observable and cannot be learned, at least
not until some time elapses. Examples would include hair-loss products or fire alarms. In
the second case, we assume that the fraction of consumers who are aware of the product
at the beginning of the period (i.e., 1 − λ) also know its quality but that the fraction of
consumers who learn about the product during the period from advertising (i.e., λ a1+a) do
not know the quality of the product. This situation would apply to a product like an anti-
histamines drug whose quality is not observable but is quickly learned from experience.
We will refer to consumers who are aware of the product and know its quality as informed
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consumers and consumers who are aware of the product and do not know its quality as
uninformed. The key difference between these two cases is in regard to how the monopolist
responds to changes in the value of λ, which will be decreasing over time. In the first case,
decreases in λ reduces the monopolist’s incentive to advertise but increases its incentive to
signal high quality; in the second case, decreases in λ reduces the monopolist’s incentive
to advertise and to signal quality.
Before analyzing these two cases, it will be useful to characterize the solution to the
model when product quality is observable so all consumers who are aware of the product
are informed. This benchmark case does not imply that all consumers are aware of the
existence of the product, but whoever is aware of the product knows its quality. In this case,
the monopolist who supplies product quality q chooses price and advertising to maximize
Πoq(p, a) =
[






where superscript o stands for the fact that product quality is observable. The high quality
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For each type of monopolist, optimal prices are independent of λ and advertising levels are
nondecreasing in λ.
The following lemma compares the solutions of the high and low quality monopolists.
Lemma 7. (i) If λ ∈ [λH , 1], then aoH > aoL (ii) poH > poL.
The Lemma states that the high quality monopolist advertises more and charges a higher
price.
3.3 Case I: No Informed Consumers
In this section, we study the case where only a fraction of the consumers are aware of
the product and they are not informed. The monopolist uses advertising to increase the
fraction of potential consumers. The high quality monopolist wants to distinguish itself
from the low quality monopolist and can use both advertising and price to do so.
Let the consumer assessment of the probability that the quality is H after observing
some price and advertising pair, (p, a), be denoted by ρ(p, a) ∈ [0, 1]. How consumers
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make the inference requires an explanation at this point. First, as it is widely assumed
in signaling literature, an unaware consumer who receives an advertisement observes all
advertising spending1. Second, all aware consumers can observe advertising spending and
price. Similarly, in Milgrom and Robert (1986), all consumers are aware of the product
and they all observe advertising spending and price. With these assumptions, consumers
who become aware of the product observe the firm’s total advertising spending and price;
thus, they hold the same inferences about the firm’s quality, ρ(p, a). The payoff of the
monopolist who supplies quality q and chooses (p, a) is
Πq(p, a; ρ) = D(p, a; ρ)(p− cq)− a,
where
D(p, a; ρ) =
[




ρH + (1− ρ)L
).
Two observations are in line at this point. First, the higher the consumer assessment
of the probability that quality is high, the bigger is the payoff of the monopolist. In other
words, for given (p, a), an increase in ρ(p, a) increases the payoff of each type of monopolist.
Hence, the low quality firm has an incentive to mimic the price and advertising selection of
the high quality firm, if this fools potential costumers. Second, when quality is observable,
consumers correctly form the belief of ρ(p, a) = 1 (ρ(p, a) = 0) for any pair of (p, a) for
the high quality firm (the low quality firm). In case of an information environment where
quality is not observable, we first define our equilibrium concept and present some basic
characteristics of separating equilibria.
1This assumption enables consumers to make the same inference for the product’s quality. However,
consumers do not have to observe all advertising spending. Only having a positive correlation between the
firm’s total advertising and consumer’s observed advertising would be qualitatively sufficient.
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A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a set of strategies {(pL, aL), (pH , aH)} and beliefs
ρ(p, a), such that: (i) each strategy is optimal given the beliefs (i.e. (pq, aq) maximizes
Πq(p, a; ρ(p, a)), and (ii) the beliefs, derived from the equilibrium strategies, are consistent
with Bayes’ rule whenever possible. In a separating equilibrium, each type plays a different
strategy (i.e., (pL, aL) 6= (pH , aH)); hence, uninformed consumers can infer quality from the
strategy of the monopolist (i.e. ρ(pH , aH) = 1 > 0 = ρ(pL, aL)). In a pooling equilibrium,
both types play the same strategy ( i.e, (pL, aL) = (pH , aH) ); hence, uninformed consumers
can infer nothing from the strategy of the monopolist (i.e., ρ(pH , aH) = ρ(pL, aL) = ρ0)
In a separating equilibrium, the low quality firm is revealed and acts as in observable
quality benchmark case, (poL, a
o




L; 0) = Π
o
L.
Therefore, to separate itself, the high quality firm must choose a pair (pH , aH) which the
low quality firm has no incentive to mimic. Hence, (pH , aH) is incentive compatible for the
low quality firm if
ΠL(pH , aH ; 1) ≤ ΠL(poL, aoL; 0) = ΠoL.
The following lemma shows that the low quality firm has an incentive to mimic
the high quality firm’s observable quality price and advertising pair, (poH , a
o
H), if this fools
potential costumers.
Lemma 8. ΠL(poH , a
o





Thus, if the high quality firm is to separate, it must distort its selection (pH , aH),





The only equilibrium outcome that survives Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) is
so-called least-cost separating outcome. In this equilibrium, the high quality firm chooses
(pH , aH) to solve the following problem:
max
p,a
ΠH(p, a; 1) =
[







ΠL(p, a; 1) =
[

















if λ ∈ (λL, 1]
(RL−cL)2
4L if λ ∈ [0, λL]
.
The following propositions and corollaries characterize the solution to the high
quality firm’s maximization problem.
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4L , 0) if λ ∈ [0, λL]
where λK=max{λ : asH(λ) = 0}, and λK > λL.
In the separating equilibrium, denoted by superscript s, the high quality monopolist
employs advertising and/or price to separate itself depending on the fraction of unaware
consumers. In the first region, the fraction of unaware consumers is high enough, (i.e.,
λ ∈ (λK , 1]), that the high quality monopolist efficiently uses both advertising and price to
separate itself. In the second region, the fraction of unaware consumers is in an intermediate
range (i.e., λ ∈ (λL, λK ]) so that the monopolist uses only price to separate. In the third
region, the fraction of unaware consumers is so low that the monopolist charges a fixed
price and does not advertise at all. In what follows, we explain the characteristics and
the underlying intuition of the separating equilibrium as the fraction of aware consumers
changes.
Corollary 1. psH is strictly decreasing in λ and greater than p
o
H .
The high quality monopolist distorts price above monopoly price and distortion
decreases with λ. Why does the high quality firm distort price upward? The answer can
be seen by considering the mimicry incentive for the low quality firm. The low quality firm
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has a lower marginal cost and would like to set a price lower than poH when consumers
believe that it is of the high quality. Hence, in order to decrease mimicry incentive of the
low quality, the distortion in price should be an increase from poH . When consumers who
are aware of the product remain uninformed about product quality, the value of signaling
decreases with λ, which in turn decreases price distortion.





The advertising is lower than it would be if product quality is observable and it
falls as the fraction of aware consumers increases. More interestingly, the high quality firm
advertises less than the low quality firm in the least-cost separating equilibrium. From
Lemma 1, remember that when quality is observable, the high quality firm advertises more
than the low quality firm. Why does low advertising expenditure signal product quality?
When believed as the the high quality firm, the low quality firm enjoys an increase in
profit margin since it can charge a higher price. Then the mimicry incentive of the low
quality firm is to expand the market by increasing advertising. By doing this, the low
quality firm takes advantage of high profit margin. As a result, the distortion should be a
decrease in advertising not an increase. Moreover, advertising falls as the fraction of aware
consumers increases for two reasons. First, the need for informative advertising decreases
as the fraction of aware consumers increases. Second, the marginal cost of advertising is the
same while the marginal benefit of advertising decreases as the fraction of aware consumers
increases. Therefore, price becomes a more efficient signal compared to advertising, which
in turn results in further decrease in advertising.
Finally, in the Proposition 1, consider the region where λ ∈ [0, λL). Why does the
high quality firm set a constant high price and advertise at zero level? In this region, the
marginal benefit of advertising is less than its marginal cost since the fraction of unaware
consumers is so small. Hence, advertising expenditure is dissipative and can only be used
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as money burning. It turns out that price is a more efficient signal for the high quality firm
compared to dissipative advertising. The cost of money burning is the same for both types
of the monopolist while decreasing demand through price hurts the low quality monopolist
more due to its higher price margin. That is why, higher quality product does not advertise
and charges high and constant price.
Existence of the separating equilibrium
The least-cost separating equilibrium exists, when the high quality firm prefer the equi-
librium pair of advertising and price (asH , p
s
H) to any other choice of advertising and price
where it is mistakenly considered as the low quality firm, that is,
ΠH(psH , a
s
H ; 1) ≥ maxp,a ΠH(p, a; 0).
The following proposition characterizes conditions under which the separating equi-
librium exists.
Proposition 4. A separating equilibrium satisfying the Intuitive Criterion exists if (i)(H-
L) is not too small and (ii)R is not too small.
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3.3.1 Numerical Example:
In this section, we propose a fully specified numerical example that give rise to above
mentioned least-cost separating equilibrium. Assume that R = 10, H = 10, cH = 5, L = 5,
and cL = 3 with which it is easy to check that both the efficiency condition, (cH/H > cL/L
), and the conditions required for the existence are satisfied.
The following figure presents advertising expenditure pattern when (i) quality is
observable (ii) quality is not observable and aware consumers are uninformed about product
quality. When product quality is not observable, the high quality firm advertises less than
the low quality firm; which in turn implies that there is a negative relationship between
product quality and advertising. Furthermore, advertising decreases as the fraction of
unaware consumers decreases.




























The following figure illustrates the unique least-cost separating equilibrium price
pattern for the high quality firm.









The Price Pattern of the High Quality Monopolist (ps
H
) 
When consumption does not reveal product quality, price rises as the fraction of
unaware consumers decreases.
3.4 Case II: Informed Consumers
Consumption reveals product quality for some products like anti-histamine drugs and CD
players. For such products, there are likely to be three kinds of consumers: informed
consumers who are aware of the product and know its quality, uninformed consumers who
are aware of the product but do not know its quality, and unaware consumers who do
not know about the product. We assume that the fraction of consumers who are aware
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of the product at the beginning of the period (i.e., 1 − λ) also know its quality but that
the fraction of consumers who learn about the product during the period from advertising
(i.e., aλ1+a) do not know the product quality.
When product quality is observable so all consumers who are aware of the product
are informed, the profit maximizing price and advertising solutions of the monopolist are
characterized in Section 2. To sum up, when quality is observable, the high quality monop-
olist advertises more and charges a higher price than the low quality firm (i.e., aoH > a
o
L
and poH > p
o
L).
We now consider the case where quality is not observable. In a separating equilib-
rium, the low quality firm is revealed and acts as if quality is observable, (poL, a
o
L) , and




L; 0). Therefore, to separate itself, the high
quality firm must choose a pair (pH , aH) which the low quality firm has no incentive to
mimic. Hence, the price and advertising pair (pH , aH) is incentive compatible for the low
quality firm if





)(p− cL) + (1− λ)(R−
p
L
)(p− cL)− a ≤ ΠoL
When some consumers have knowledge of the product’s quality, the LHS of the in-
equality represents the low quality firm’s mimicry profit (ΠL(pH , aH ; 1)). By masquerading
as high quality, the low quality monopolist could only deceive the uninformed consumers,
represented by λa1+a , but not the informed consumers, represented by (1 − λ). Moreover,
since the LHS of the inequality is increasing in λ, an increase in the fraction of informed
consumers decreases the mimicry profit of the low quality monopolist.





ΠH(p, a; 1) =
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ΠL(p, a; 1) = (1− λ)(R−
p
L





)(p− cL)− a ≤ ΠoL
It is not possible to get a closed form solution easily, because the first order condition
with respect to price (advertising) is a nonlinear function of advertising (price). Instead, in
the following proposition, we characterize the properties of the solution to the high quality
firm’s maximization problem.
Proposition 5. In the unique separating equilibrium that satisfies the Intuitive Criteria,
(psiL , a
si















(ii) if λ ∈ [0, λI ], then (psiH , asiH) = (poH , aoH).
The intuition goes as follows. As the fraction of informed consumers increases,
it becomes more costly for the low quality firm to masquerade as the high quality firm.
Thus, it is optimal for the high quality firm to decrease the distortion in both price and
advertising. When the fraction of informed consumers reaches a certain threshold, the high
35
quality firm is able to charge its observable quality price and advertising pair while the low
quality firm does not mimic and acts as if quality is observable.
Existence of the separating equilibrium
The least-cost separating equilibrium exists, when the high quality firm prefer the equi-
librium pair of advertising and price (asiH , p
si
H) to any other choice of advertising and price
where it is mistakenly considered as the low quality firm, that is,
ΠH(psiH , a
si
H ; 1) ≥ maxp,a ΠH(p, a; 0).
The following proposition characterizes conditions under which the separating equi-
librium exists.
Proposition 6. A separating equilibrium satisfying the Intuitive Criterion exists if (i)(H-
L) is not too small and (ii)R is not too small.
The following section numerically solves the high quality firm’s maximization prob-









L), where superscript si stands for separating when some consumers are
informed.
3.4.1 Numerical Example:
We assume the same parametrization as in the numerical example of previous section i.e.,
that R = 10, H = 10, cH = 5, L = 5, and cL = 3. When awareness leads to knowledge of
product quality, the following graph illustrates the advertising pattern of the high quality,
(psiH , a
si




L) in the separating equilibrium.
Advertising is lower than it would be if product quality is observable. As the
fraction of informed consumers increases, advertising follows an inverted U shape. The
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advertising of the high quality monopolist (i.e., asiH) first increases, but at a decreasing rate
and then turns downward and converges to its observable quality advertising level (i.e.,
aoH). More importantly, as more consumers become aware and informed, the distortion
in advertising decreases. The reason is simple. As the fraction of informed consumers
increases, it becomes more costly for the low quality monopolist to signal a high quality
falsely to uninformed consumers. As a result, the high quality monopolist can signal quality
with a smaller advertising distortion.
When awareness leads to knowledge of product quality, the following graph presents
the price pattern in the separating equilibrium.
Price is higher than it would be if product quality is observable. The intuition is
as follows. A low quality monopolist would lose more sales from informed consumers by
charging a high price; hence, uninformed consumers rationally infer higher quality from
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The Price Pattern of the High Quality Monopolist (psi
H
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the higher price. As the fraction of aware consumers increases, price falls and converges to
observable quality price. In other words, as more consumers become aware and informed,
distortion in price decreases because it becomes more costly for the low quality monopolist
to mimic a high quality and fool uninformed consumers.
3.5 Empirical Predictions
In both the marketing and economics literature, the theoretical and empirical relationship
between price, advertising and product quality has been studied extensively. Starting with
Nelson (1974), this relationship has mostly been explained through the signaling approach
where price and advertising could function as a signal of unobservable product quality.
In what follows, we present our contribution to this literature and find support for our
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empirical predictions from a data set on Direct-to-Consumer advertising on pharmaceutical
drugs.
When all consumers are aware of the product but not all are informed about the
quality of the product, Bagwell and Riordon (1991) show that the high quality firm will dis-
tort price upward and that the price will decline with the fraction of informed consumers.
Hence, they predict a positive correlation between price and quality. Linnemer (2002) uses
the same model with Bagwell and Riordan except he allows the firm to use (dissipative)
advertising as well as price to signal quality. He shows that as the fraction of informed
consumers increases, prices are high and decreasing while advertising is zero during intro-
ductory and mature phases of the product cycle, but positive during the expansion phase.
A positive relationship between advertising and quality follows for only expansion phase
of the product cycle.
By giving advertising a positive role in making consumers aware of the product, we
show that as the fraction of aware consumers increases, advertising takes on an inverted
U-shape. In early phase of the product cycle, the correlation between advertising and
quality is negative while it becomes positive during the expansion and the mature phases.
Horstmann and MacDonald (2003) study data on advertising and price from the compact
disc player market. They find that price falls at an accelerating pace and that advertising
exhibits an inverted U shape. They were not able to reconcile these results with existing
signaling models. However, the results are consistent with the model developed in this
paper under the assumption that some of the consumers who are aware of the product are
also informed, and that the fraction of informed consumers grows over time.
We next propose some evidence to inverted U shaped advertising pattern from a
data set on Direct-to-Consumer advertising on pharmaceutical drugs. Direct to Consumer
Advertising (DTCA) expenditure, obtained from TNS Media Intelligence, consists of indi-
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vidual brand-name drugs. TNS Media Intelligence monitors advertising expenditures for
various media such as radios, newspapers, magazines, and TVs. Their database include all
advertising expenditure for prescriptions drug that appears in these media. We have total
monthly advertising expenditure from 1996 to 2002. The FDA’s Orange Book is used for
the approval dates. In most of the cases, the approval date and the launch dates of the
products coincide while sometimes there is only small difference. To calculate the age of
the drug, we consider the approval date as a launch date of the drug.
We first consider the drugs which have approval dates between 1996 and 1998 and
have stayed in the market for at least five years. There are 25 brand-name drugs in this
category. The following first graph summarizes the average monthly advertising level of
these drugs as a function of age of the drug.
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However, the advertising expenditure pattern differs for individual prescription
drugs in our sample. For instance, Singulair, an allergy relief prescription drug, is ap-
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proved by the FDA in February 1998. Average annual advertising pattern of Singulair is






















Consumption of Singulair is likely to reveal its quality. If the fraction of informed
consumers grows over time, our model predicts that the advertising takes an inverted U
shape, which is consistent with the advertising pattern of Singulair.
In related literature, Overgaard (1991), Zhao (2000), Orzach et al. (2002), and
Bagwell and Overgaard (2005) study signaling models in which advertising enhances de-
mand but product quality is not observable. These papers show that the high quality firm
will distort price upward and advertising downward relative to the case in which product
quality is observable. In other words, they predict a positive correlation between price
and quality and a negative correlation between adverting and quality. When consumption
does not reveal product quality (i.e., consumers who are aware of the product remain un-
informed about the product quality ), our model predicts that advertising decreases over
entire life cycle of the product and the correlation between price and quality is positive
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and strengthens as the fraction of aware consumers increases.
For example, the FDA approved Propecia, hair loss prescription drug 2, in December
1997 and Propecia is an example of the goods for which consumption does not reveal
product quality easily. Our model predicts that advertising decreases over entire life cycle
of the product. The following graph presents annual average advertising expenditures for






















2From Merck’s webpage“Propecia was developed to treat mild to moderate male pattern hair loss ...Re-
membering to take your pill each day is important...Most men see results 3 to 12 months after starting
Propecia...If Propecia has not worked within 12 months, further treatment is not likely to help.”
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Chapter 4
Response to Competitive Entry:
Signal Jamming
4.1 Introduction
We show that if the quality of the entrant is certain, the income distribution of consumers
and the quality difference between the entrant and the incumbent determine whether entry
of a new firm to an industry with an incumbent is possible or not. If the income distribution
is small or qualities are “far apart”, it is likely that the incumbent captures all of the market
in which each and every consumer prefers the product of the incumbent to the product
of the entrant. As the income distribution increases or if qualities are “close”, it is more
likely to observe a profitable entry. In other words, as the income distribution increases, the
industry evolves from having a monopoly to having duopoly with a fully covered market
and from there the industry evolves to a partially covered market with a duopoly. This part
of the paper is mostly similar to the model of Shaked and Sutton (1982). We also show that
if the quality of the entrant is uncertain, the high quality entrant may have an incentive to
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separate itself from the low quality entrant while the incumbent has an incentive to jam
the quality signalling attempt. This part of the paper is related to Kalra et al. (1998)
in the sense that they propose the similar idea of signal jamming and a candidate for a
signal-jamming equilibrium in their paper. We also propose a signal-jamming (pooling)
equilibrium and numerically show that, for a large set of parametric values, this signal-
jamming equilibrium indeed exists.
This part of the paper is also related to Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) in which they
propose a new theory of predation based on “signal-jamming”. In their model, the entrant,
uncertain about its future profitability, uses its initial period profit to estimate its future
profit and decide whether to exit or not while the incumbent jams the inference of the
entrant to induce it to exit. Moreover, the quality signalling attempt of the entrant is
also related to the signalling literature. As an example of the signalling under monopoly
setting, Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001a) show that pure price separation is not possible
if the vertical differentiation is small. Moreover, Fluet and Garella (2002) and Hertzendorf
and Overgaard (2001a, 2001b, and 2002) study price signalling along with the possibility of
advertising in a multi-sender context with two competing firms. These papers are different
from our paper for three reasons. First, some of them have only a single sender while in
our setup there are two competing firms. Second, the papers with a multi-sender context
have the common informational assumption that consumers do not know the quality of
either firm so that both firms try to convey their quality to consumers. For example, if
the firms adopt the same strategy (pooling), consumers will not be able to distinguish the
two. Finally, none of these models considers the possibility of signal jamming.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In section 2, we outline the basic
model and characterize the best response functions and possible market structures when the
quality of the entrant is observable. In section 3, we present signal-jamming equilibrium
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when the quality of the entrant is unobservable. We also show that in this equilibrium
the incumbent jams the entrant’s separation attempt and increases its profit by doing so.
Section 4 concludes the article. Proofs are in the Appendix.
4.2 The Model
The incumbent produces a product with the quality, qI , at the marginal cost, cI and
faces a new entry to the market. The entrant manufactures an inferior product and for
simplicity we assume that it has two possible quality levels either low, qL, or high, qH .
The corresponding marginal costs are cL and cH respectively. We impose the following
assumptions on product quality and cost: (i)qL < qH < qI and (ii) cL < cH < cI . The
condition (i) states that the entrant has an inferior product compared to the incumbent and
the high quality entrant has a better quality product compared to the low quality entrant.
The condition (ii) states that the higher quality is more costly to produce. Moreover, we
postulate that the incumbent can observe the entrant’s quality through reverse engineering.
Finally, the incumbent and the entrant set their prices simultaneously.
There are total mass of N consumers in the market. They all know the incumbent’s
product quality. This is a reflection of the fact that consumers are already familiar with
the product or have consumed it before. Furthermore, consumers can not observe the en-
trant’s product quality while they know that the entrant’s quality could be either low or
high. This reflects the fact that firms generally have better information than the consumers
have and reverse engineering is prohibitively expensive to undertake for an individual con-
sumer. Moreover, consumers are identical in tastes, but differentiated in income. Incomes,
represented by θ, are uniformly distributed on some support 0 < a ≤ θ ≤ b with unitary
density. Each consumer can purchase either one unit of the product or make no purchase.
In case of no purchase, they consume a Hicksian “composite commodity” with the quality
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of qo and the price of po = 0. The net surplus of a consumer with income θ is given by
u(pi, qi|θ) = qi(θ − pi) i ∈ {o, L,H, I}
where pi represents the market price for the product i and similarly qi denotes the quality
for the product i. Without loss of generality, we normalize the total mass of consumers to
be unity, i.e., N=1.
4.3 The Entrant’s Quality is Observable
In what follows, we first characterize the solution to the model when the entrant’s quality is
observable by consumers. We need to consider two cases: (i) the entrant is of high quality
and (ii) the entrant is of low quality. Instead of analyzing case (i) and (ii) separately,
we denote the entrant as E ∈ {L,H} so that qE ∈ {qH , qL} denotes the E-type entrant’s
quality while cE ∈ {cH , cL} denotes its marginal cost.
We first derive the incumbent’s and the entrant’s demand and profit functions. A
pair set of prices (pI , pE) represents prices of the incumbent and the entrant respectively. A
consumer is indifferent in purchasing from the incumbent and the entrant, if qI(θI − pI) =
qE(θI−pE); that is the indifferent consumer at θI gets the same net surplus from consuming
either product. A consumer is indifferent in purchasing the product of the entrant and not
making a purchase at all, if qE(θE − pE) = qo(θE − po).
The critical thresholds θI and θE can be calculated as follows
qI(θI − pI) = qE(θI − pE) ⇔ θI =
qIpI − qEpE
qI − qE




In what follows, we focus on the pair of prices (pI , pE) in which θI > θE .1 Then it is easy
to see that consumers with income θ > θI strictly prefer the product of the incumbent at
price pI to the product of the entrant at pE . Similarly, consumers with income θI > θ > θE
strictly prefer the product of the entrant at price pE to the composite good at po = 0. The
rest of the consumers with income θE > θ, does not make a purchase and consumes the
composite good.
Now we can write down the demands of the entrant and the incumbent as follows
DE =

θI − a = qIpI − qEpEqI − qE − a if θE ≤ a
θI − θE = qIpI − qEpEqI − qE −
qEpE
qE − qo if θE ≥ a




The profit of the entrant and the incumbent can be written as follows
ΠE =

(pE − cE)(qIpI − qEpEqI − qE − a) if θE ≤ a
(pE − cE)(qIpI − qEpEqI − qE −
qEpE
qE − qo ) if θE ≥ a










restricting ourself to this price region, we exclude the possibility that the entrant can drive the incumbent
out of the market.
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Lemma 9. The best response functions take the form of
pE =

qIpI − a(qI − qE) + cEqE
2qE if θE ≤ a
qI(qE − qo)pI + qEcE(qI − qo)
2qE(qI − qo)
if θE ≥ a
,
pI =
qEpE + b(qI − qE) + cIqI
2qI
.
Note that the entrant’s reaction function, pE(pI), is increasing in the incumbent’s
price, pI while the incumbent’s reaction function, pI(pE), is increasing in the entrant’s
price, pE . This indicates the fact that the entrant’s and the incumbent’s price strategies
are strategically complementary to each other.
We identify four separate market structures and corresponding regions depending
on income distributions. The following lemma presents the conditions on the range of
income distribution which in turn determines whether the solution to lie in region 0,I, II,
or III.
Lemma 10. The solution lies in
Region 0 if cIqI−qEcEqI−qE ≤ b ≤ 2a−
cIqI−qEcE
qI−qE ,





Region II if (2qI+qE−3qoqI−qE )a−
cIqI−2qEcE









The intersection of the best response functions of the entrant and the incumbent
will determine the solution and, in turn, market structure. For various values of income
distributions, i.e., only b changes, the following figure presents the best response functions
of the entrant and the incumbent and the corresponding solutions
Whether solution lies in region 0, I, II or III depends on where the increasing best
response function of the incumbent intersects with the best response function of the entrant
and that in turn depends on the range of income distribution.
If the range of income distribution is small, i.e., b is close to a, the solution lies in
Region 0 where the incumbent stays as the sole provider of the product. In this region,
the entrant can not make a sale even though it sells its product at its marginal cost of cE .
Technically speaking, θI is less than the lowest income, a, so that all consumers prefer the
product of the incumbent to both the product of the entrant and the composite product.
If the range of income distribution is intermediate, the solution lies in Region I where the
entrant can also make a sale along with the incumbent. Technically speaking, θI (θE) is
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bigger (less) than the lowest income level, a. In this region, the market is fully covered;
that is, each consumer purchases from either the entrant or the incumbent. Moreover,
Region II corresponds to a certain range of b and a such that θE = a. Over this range of
parameter values, the entrant leaves its price constant while the price of incumbent varies.
In other words, the entrant faces a kinked demand schedule at this price. Finally, if the
range of income distribution is high, i.e., b is very high compared to a, both firms coexist
and make a sale in the market. Technically speaking, both θE and θI are bigger than the
lowest income level. In this region, some consumers purchase neither product and hence,
the market is not covered.
The regions 0, I, II, and III are illustrated for various values of a and b in the
following figure.
It is clear in this figure that the range of income distribution plays a key role in
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determining market structure. For example, on the vertical axis, if we fix any value of b
with a small value of a, the range of income distribution is high at this point. As a result
the solution lies in Region III. With the same value of b, if we keep increasing the value of
a, the range of income distribution gets smaller and finally the solution lies in Region 0.
Alternatively, as the range of income distribution increases, the market evolves from being
a monopoly in Region 0 to a duopoly with coexistence of the entrant and the incumbent
in Region III where the market is not fully covered.
4.4 The Entrant’s Quality is not Observable
In what follows, we consider the case where the entrant manufactures the product of
uncertain quality, either low or high. Let ρo denote the ex ante probability of the entrant
being high quality. Consumers perfectly observe the incumbent’s quality, qI . The timing
of the game is as follows. In the first stage, nature chooses a quality level of the entrant: qL
or qH , which is observable by both the incumbent and the entrant, but not by consumers.
In the second stage, the incumbent and the entrant simultaneously choose their prices pI
and pE , which are observable by the consumers. Then consumers form their belief about
the quality of the entrant. The consumer belief, ρ(pI , pE), denotes the probability of the
entrant being high type. Finally consumers make the purchase decision. The solution
concept, we use in this paper, is sequential equilibrium by Kreps and Wilson (1981).
A Sequential Equilibrium is a set of pricing strategies {(pL, pI), (pH , pI)} and beliefs
ρ(pI , pE), such that: (i) each pricing strategy of the entrants is optimal given the optimal
action on the part of the incumbent firm and optimal purchasing strategy and beliefs
of consumers, (ii) the incumbent’s pricing strategy is optimal given the optimal type-
contingent strategies of the entrant and the optimal purchasing strategy and beliefs of
consumers, (iii) consumers make the optimal purchase decision given the optimal type-
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contingent pricing strategies of the entrant and the pricing strategy of the incumbent, and
(iv) the beliefs, derived from the equilibrium strategies, are consistent with Bayes’ rule
whenever possible. In our analysis, we focus on the separating and pooling sequential
equilibria. In a separating equilibrium, each type plays a different strategy, i.e., (pL, pI) 6=
(pH , pI). Hence, consumers can infer the quality from the pricing strategy of the entrant,
i.e., ρ(pH , pI) = 1 > 0 = ρ(pL, pI). In a pooling equilibrium, both types of the entrants
play the same pricing strategy and the incumbent plays the same strategy irrespective of
the entrant’s type, i.e., (pL, pI) = (pH , pI). Hence, consumers cannot infer the quality
of the entrant from the pricing strategies and consumers’ ex post belief of entrant being
high quality is equal to the consumers ex ante belief of entrant being high quality, i.e.,
ρ(pH , pI) = ρ(pL, pI) = ρ0.
In what follows, we focus on the region or market structure in which both the
incumbent and the entrant coexist while the market is not fully covered, i.e., Region III.
This market structure corresponds to the specific market structure analyzed in Kalra et
al. (1998) 2
4.4.1 Least-Cost Separation Attempt by the Entrant
This part presents and models the the fact that the H-type entrant has incentive to signal
its quality. When consumers are uncertain about the quality of entrant’s product, they
base their purchase decision on the expected quality of the entrant’s product, q̃E = ρqH +
(1 − ρ)qL, and qI . Since qH > q̃E , the H-type entrant’s profit decreases compared to the
case where the entrant’s quality is observable by consumers. Therefore, the H-type entrant
stands to gain from revealing its true type to consumers. In fact, it is easy to show that
2By following Kalra et al. (1998), in this paper we ignore the possibility that the incumbent can drive
out the entrant completely from the market by charging very low price i.e., predatory pricing. In a future
research project, it would be interesting to show that an entrant who can enter under complete information
may not able to do so under incomplete information because of signal jamming by the incumbent.
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∂ΠHH/∂q̃E > 0. The following lemma summarizes this result.
Lemma 11. Given the price of the incumbent, the H-type entrant’s profit increases in its
perceived quality.
This provides the necessary incentive for the H-type entrant to engage in quality
signalling. However, the H-quality entrant has to adopt a pricing strategy which makes
mimicry unprofitable for the L-type entrant. In the next proposition, we show that the
H-type entrant can signal its quality by increasing its price above its complete information
level.
Proposition 7. For any prices of the incumbent, the H-type entrant can signal its quality
by increasing its price above its complete information level, i.e.,
∂ΠL(q̃E , pI , cL)
∂pH
/
∂ΠH(q̃E , pI , cH)
∂pH
> 1 for any pH ≥ p∗H ,
where p∗H stands for the complete information price of the H-type entrant.
In other words, this proposition indicates that the single-crossing condition is sat-
isfied in this environment. Hence, the H-type entrant can discourage the mimicry of the
L-type entrant by increasing its own price above its optimal complete information price.
The following constraint optimization problem gives us the least cost separating





























where the subscript in Πij stands for the entrant’s true quality while the superscript stands
for the entrant’s perceived quality by consumers and p∗L denotes the complete information
price of the L-type entrant and is derived in Lemma 9.
In its separation attempt, the high quality firm needs to distort its full information
price upwards to avoid the mimicry by the L-type entrant. This distortion successfully and
profitably signals to consumers that pQSH is indeed set by the H-type entrant.
Lemma 12. For a given price of the incumbent, pI , the least cost separating price strategy
of the H-type entrant is
pQSH =
qIpI(qH − qo)(1 + λ1) + qLcL(qI − qo)(cH + cLλ1)
2qH(qI − qo)(1 + λ1)
where
λ1 = −1 +
qH(qI − qo)(cH − cL)√
[qIpI(qH − qo) + qHcL(qI − qo)]2 − 4qH(qI − qo)(qI − qH)(qH − qo)ΠLL
For any given price of the incumbent, pQSH (pI) is the H-type entrant’s the least cost
separating price strategy.
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4.4.2 Signal-Jamming Pricing by the Incumbent
In this section, we show that for certain parameter values, even though the H-type attempts
to separate, the attempt will not be successful due to signal jamming by the incumbent.
It is easy to show that the incumbent’s profit decreases in perceived quality of the
entrant, i.e., ∂ΠI/∂q̃E < 0. The following lemma summarizes this result.
Lemma 13. Given the price of the entrant, pE, the incumbent’s profit decreases in the
perceived quality of the entrant.
The following lemma states that the incumbent can increase the signalling cost of
the entrant by distorting its own price upwards.
Lemma 14. As the incumbent’s price increases, the signalling cost of the high quality
entrant increases.
In the following lemma, we show that an increase in price of the incumbent increases
the mimicry incentive of the low type entrant.
Lemma 15. As the incumbent’s price increases, the mimicry incentive of the low quality
incentive increases.
These three lemmas provide the necessary incentive for the incumbent to engage in
signal-jamming, in which the entrant’s attempt to signal quality is no longer be optimal
and it prefers to be pooled with the L-quality entrant.
The signal-jamming (SJ) pricing strategy of the incumbent can be derived from the
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following constraint optimization problem
pSJI ∈ argmaxpI
ΠI(pI , pH) = (pI − cI)
[




























where p ρoH is the price set by the H-type entrant when consumers believe that it has an
average quality of q̃E = ρoqH + (1− ρo)qL.
The constraint is that the H-type entrant weakly prefers being pooled with the L-
type entrant to engaging in quality signalling. This constraint optimization problem of the
incumbent gives us the incumbent’s signal-jamming best response function for any given
price of the entrant.
We can now propose our candidate for the signal-jamming equilibrium. We define
(pSJI , p
SJ
E ) as the equilibrium to the complete information game in which the entrant’s
type is of q̃E , i.e., the expected value of qH and qL. We propose that the pair of prices
(pSJI , p
SJ
E ), the intersection of the incumbent’s and the entrant’s best replies in this complete
information game, is a Signal-Jamming equilibrium. The off-the-equilibrium beliefs are as
follows. Consumers believe that the quality of the entrant is low if price is not equal to
pSJE but less than the least-cost separating price response to p
SJ
E and high otherwise. Also,
consumers believe that the quality of the entrant is high if the incumbent price is not equal
to pSJI .
The first necessary condition to be satisfied is that the profit of the low quality
entrant if it reveals itself and sets its price equal to best reply to pSJI is not greater than its
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pooling profit at (pSJI , p
SJ
E ). In other words, as it is represented in the following inequality,





















I (qL − qo)− qLcL(qI − qo)
]2














I (q̃E − qo)− q̃EcH(qI − qo)
]
4q̃E(qI − qo)(qI − q̃E)(q̃E − qo)
The second necessary condition to be satisfied is that the profit of the high quality
entrant if it reveals itself and sets the price equal to the least-cost separating response to




E ). This is equivalent to showing that
the constraint in the signal jamming optimization problem above is satisfied. However, if
this condition is satisfied, i.e., the constraint of H-type is not binding, then, by definition,
the pSJI is a best response to the p
SJ
E . This means that the incumbent has no incentive to
deviate as well.
It is possible to simplify these necessary conditions, especially the first one, since
it is is a quadratic function of either pSJE or p
SJ
I . However, overall even the simplified
versions will be complex expressions of either pSJE or p
SJ
I . Instead, we solve these complex
expression numerically to show that this signal-jamming equilibrium exists. It is also easy
to show that the equilibrium exists for large set of parameter values.
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In what follows, a numerical example illustrates the signal-jamming equilibrium,
we just proposed. Let the marginal cost of the incumbent, cI , be 5, the marginal costs of
the H- (cH) and the L-type (cL) entrants be 3 and 0, respectively. Moreover, the quality
of the incumbent product, qI , is 25, while those of the H- (qH), the L-type (qL) entrants
and the composite product are 19, 10, and 2, respectively. The ex-ante probability of
the entrant’s product quality being high, ρo, is 0.7. Under this set of parametric values,
the complete information, separating, and signal-jamming equilibrium are presented in the
following figure.




















In the figure, p∗I(pE) and p
SJ
I (pE) denote the complete information and signal-
jamming best response functions of the incumbent respectively while p∗H(pI), p
ρo
H (pI), and
pQSH (pI) denote the high quality under complete information, the average quality under
complete information, and the quality signalling least cost price strategy of the high quality
entrant respectively. Moreover, the signal-jamming equilibrium in this numerical example
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satisfies all the necessary conditions, identified above. At this point, it is in line to make
three important observations about the signal-jamming equilibrium.
The first observation is that given price of the incumbent, pI , the equilibrium price
of the entrant with observable quality, p∗H(pI), is lower than the equilibrium price with
unobservable quality, pQSH (pI) , in the relevant region. In other words, the H-type entrant
increases its price above the complete information level in its separation attempt. Also, the
equilibrium price of the entrant when its quality is observable, p∗H , is 6.38 and it increases
to 11.75 under quality signalling without signal jamming. This increase is to deter the
mimicry of the L-type entrant.
The second observation is that the incumbent increases its own price to decrease the
separation incentive of the entrant. The incumbent’s equilibrium price when the entrant’s
quality is observable, p∗I , is 10.05. However, in case of unobservable quality, the incumbent’s
equilibrium price under separation attempt of the entrant is 12.08 while its price under
signal-jamming, pSJI , is 12.4.
The third observation is that the incumbent increases its profit more than 10% by
signal jamming: hence, it has an incentive to jam the separation attempt of the entrant.
The incumbent’s profit when the entrant’s quality is known is only 106.26 and it increases
to 209.41 when the entrant’s quality is not observable and the incumbent does not engage
in signal-jamming. However, the incumbent’s profit with signal jamming is 232.35.
We have repeated the numerical analysis for large set of parameter values and find




In chapter 2, our analysis has revealed that in vertically related industries with production
lag, vertical integration is pro-competitive and not profitable if firms behave competitively.
However, we show that vertical integration facilitates collusion, in which case it is profitable.
Two effects are important for this result: the quick response effect and the lack of pre-
commitment effect.
The quick response effect arises because the integration creates efficiency by short-
ening the order-to-delivery lag thereby enabling the integrated downstream firm to respond
to deviations of cartel members faster. This effect eliminates all deviation incentive of the
unintegrated downstream firm. As a result, whether the vertical merger facilitates collu-
sion or not solely depends on the integrated firm. Within period deviation profit of the
integrated firm stays the same as it were in vertically separated case. However, ordering
quantity in advance does not carry a commitment value for the integrated firm, which re-
sults in the lack of pre-commitment effect. This effect reduces the profit of the integrated
firm in the punishment phase and in turn facilitates collusion.
Chapter 3 gives advertising a positive role in making consumers aware of the product
and examines the impact of increasing product awareness on advertising and on price. We
study this issue in a static model under two kinds of information environments. When
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awareness leads to knowledge of product quality, price is higher and advertising is lower
than they would be if product quality is observable. As the fraction of aware consumers
increases, price declines and advertising follows an inverted U shape. Thus, the distortion
on both price and advertising decreases as more consumers become aware and informed.
When product awareness does not lead to knowledge of product quality, price is higher
and advertising is lower than they would be if product quality is observable and, as the
fraction of aware consumers increases, price rises and advertising decreases. Thus, the
distortion on price gets larger and the distortion on advertising gets smaller. We also find
support for these empirical observations from a data set on Direct-to-Consumer advertising
on pharmaceutical drugs.
In chapter 4, we show that if the quality of the entrant is certain, whether the
entrant can receive a positive market share or not depends on the income distribution of
consumers and the quality difference between the entrant and the incumbent. If the income
distribution is small or if qualities are “far apart”, it is more likely that the incumbent
captures all of the market in which each and every consumer prefers the product of the
incumbent to the product of the entrant. As the income distribution increases, the entrant
is more likely to have a positive market share along with the incumbent. In other words, as
the income distribution increases, the industry evolves from having a monopoly to having
duopoly with a fully covered market and from there it evolves to a partially covered market
with a duopoly.
By following Kalra et al.(1998), we also observe that if the quality of the entrant is
uncertain, the H-type entrant has incentive to signal its quality while the incumbent can
profitably prevent this signalling attempt. We propose a pooling equilibrium as a candidate




Proof of Lemma 1:
Two downstream firm, say firm 1 and firm 2, make quantity orders order of k1 and k2 re-
spectively at the order stage. The price of input is c. Each firm takes into account the fact
that the amount it orders in a period determines the maximum amount that it can supply
to the market in that period. In other words, supplied quantity, qi can not be more than
ki. Then firms compete in Cournot fashion in the competition stage by setting quantities,
qi ≤ ki. We are looking for the subgame perfect equilibrium of this static game. We start
solving the game from the last stage.
Competition Stage: At this stage, let k1 and k2 denote quantity order of Firm 1 and Firm
2 respectively. Each firm maximizes its profit by setting qi
max
qi
qi(a− qi − qj)− cki s.t. qi ≤ ki
There are four separate regions to consider depending on the values of k1 and k2, which
determines whether constraints are binding or not.
Region 1: k1 ≤ a−k22 and k2 ≤
a−k1
2
In this region, the constraints of both firms bind. This means that it is profitable for each
firm to supply to the market up to their full capacity, i.e., qi = ki. The profit functions are
Πi = ki(a− ki − kj)− cki for i, j = 1, 2.
Region 2: k1 ≤ a−k22 and k2 >
a−k1
2
In this region, it is easy to see that only firm 1’s constraint is binding, i.e. q∗1 = k1. The
profit function of firm 2 is
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Π2 = q2(a− k1 − q2)− ck2
The firm 2’s best response is q∗2 =
a−k1
2 .
Region 3: k1 > a−k22 and k2 ≤
a−k1
2
In this region, it is easy to see that only firm 2’s constraint is binding,i.e. q∗2 = k2. The
profit function of firm 1 is
Π1 = q1(a− q1 − k2)− ck1
The firm1’s best response is q∗1 =
a−k2
2
Region 4: k1 > a−k22 and k2 >
a−k1
2
In this region, the constrains of both firms are non-binding: hence, each firm maximize the
following profit functions.
Πi = qi(a− qi − qj)− cki for i, j = 1, 2.
The equilibrium is characterized by Cournot quantities under zero marginal cost,
i.e. q∗i =
a




− cki for i = 1, 2.
Order Stage: We can move up to the order stage to derive what the subgame perfect
equilibrium is. Let’s start from Region 4. In this region, both firms are ordering more
than what they need in competition stage, and it is optimal for both to reduce their orders
to ki = q∗i =
a
3 to minimize their costs. However, ki =
a
3 is not in the Region 4: hence,
subgame perfect equilibrium can not be in this region. Now let’s analyze the Region 3. In
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this region, the firm 1’s best response is to reduce it order to q∗1 =
a−k2
2 to minimize its
cost. However, k1 = a−k22 is not in the Region 3: hence, the subgame perfect equilibrium
can not be in Region 3. Similarly, the equilibrium can not be in Region 2. The only region
where the equilibrium reside is Region 1. In this region, both firms produces up to their
capacities k1 and k2. The profit functions are
Πi = ki(a− ki − kj)− cki for i, j = 1, 2.
At the order stage both firms choose their capacities to maximize the profit function above.
Hence, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the stage game is the Cournot equilib-
rium, i.e. k1 = k2 = a−c3 .
Proof of lemma 2:
We first show that downstream firm j’s critical discount factor, δj , decreases as its own
share, αj , increases. The downstream j’s critical discount factor is
δj =
9(1 + αj)2 − 36αj
9(1 + αj)2 − 16
=
(1 + αj)2 − 4αj
(1 + αj)2 − 169
We first introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 16. (i)If z < 2(1 + α), f(α, z) = (1+α)
2−4α
(1+α)2−z decreases in α.






[2(1 + α)− 4]
[
(1 + α)2 − z
]
− 2(1 + α)
[
(1 + α)2 − 4α
]
[(1 + α)2 − z]2
=
−2z(1 + α)− 4(1− α)2 + 4z + 8(1 + α)α
[(1 + α)2 − z]2
=
2 [z − 2(1 + α)] (1− α)
[(1 + α)2 − z]2
From the last expression, it is easy to see that if z < 2(1 + α), f(α, z) decreases in α.
Since the value of z in the downstream firm j’s critical discount factor is 169 and it
is less than 2(1 + αj), the downstream firm j’s critical discount factor decreases in αj .
The cartel’s critical discount factor is δ = max{δ1, δ2}. This discount factor is min-
imized at α1 = α2 = 12 since both δ1 and δ2 decreases in its share and α1 + α2 = 1. Now
plugging this solution α1 = α2 = 12 into the cartel’s discount factor yields that δ =
9
17 .
Proof of Lemma 3:
Let Firm 1 be the integrated firm and and Firm 2 the unintegrated firm. The price of
input is c. Here is the timing of the stage game. The Firm 2 moves first and chooses its
capacity, k2 at the order stage. Then the Firm 1 moves second and chooses its capacity,
k1. Since input production takes time, the Firm 1 must produce its capacity before the
competition stage. Let’s call this stage where the Firm 1 moves as interim stage. Finally, at
the competition stage, both firms set their quantities,q1 and q2, in Cournot fashion taking
into account that q1 ≤ k1 and q2 ≤ k2.
Let’t solve the game starting from the last stage.
Competition Stage: At this stage, Firm 1 and Firm 2 have already installed their capacities,
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k1 and k2. They simply play a Cournot game with capacity constraints: q1 ≤ k1 and
q1 ≤ k1.
We have already analyzed this subgame in the proof of lemma 1. The result is that
firms produce up to their capacities (Region 1: k1 ≤ a−k22 and k2 ≤
a−k1
2 ). The payoff
functions of Firm 1 and Firm 2 are as follows
Π1 = k1(a− k1 − k2)− ck1
Π2 = k2(a− k1 − k2)− ck2
Interim Stage: This is the stage between the order and competition stages. At this stage,
Firm 1 moves and installs its capacity, k1 by taking the Firm 2’s capacity, k2, as given.
Firm 1 maximizes the following profit function
Π1 = k1(a− k1 − k2)− ck1




Order Stage: This is the stage Firm 2 installs its capacity,k2 by taking the Firm 1’s best
response function as given. Firm 2 maximizes the following profit function

















Proof of Lemma 4:
We need to first show that the integrated firm’s critical discount, δ1, decreases in its own
share, α1. The integrated firm’s critical discount factor is
δ ≥ δ1 ≡
(1 + α1)2 − 4α1
(1 + α1)2 − 1
Notice that the condition, z < 2(1 +α), of the lemma 16 is satisfied in this function
in which z=1. Hence, we can directly conclude that this critical discount factor decreases
in α1.












Since the integrated firm 1’s critical discount factor, δ1, decreases in α1, the down-
stream firm 1’s the minimum discount factor is minimized at the maximum value of α1,
which is 12 . Plugging this solution, α1 =
1
2 , into δ1 yields the minimum discount factor for
the cartel, which is δI = 15 .
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Proof of Proposition 1:
From lemma 2, we know that in vertically separated industry, the minimum discount factor
δ¬I is 917 . However, in lemma 4, we show that the minimum discount factors with vertical
merger is 15 , which is less than
9
17 . Hence, the vertical merger facilitates collusion.




[2(1 + α)− 4]
[
2(m+ 1)[(m+ 1)2 + 4m
]
− [2(m+ 1) + 4] (m+ 1)2
[(m+ 1)2 + 4m]2
=
8(m+ 1)m− 4
[(m+ 1)2 + 4m]2
> 0
Proof of Lemma 6:
Let’s call the integrated firm as the Firm 1 and the other unintegrated downstream as the
Firm j, where j ∈ {2, 3, ...,m}. The Firm 1 chooses its production in Stage 3 by taking the
production of the unintegrated firms as given
max
q1
q1[a− c− q1 − (m− 1)qj ]
We can write the first order conditions as follows
a− c− q1 − (m− 1)qj − q1 = 0 <=> q1 =
a− c− (m− 1)qj
2
.
In Stage 2, the Firm j chooses its production qj while it takes into account the Firm 1’s
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production best response, q1.
max
qj
qj [a− c− qj − (m− 2)q̃j + q1] = qj [a− c− qj − (m− 2)q̃j +
a− c− qj − (m− 2)q̃j
2
]
The first order conditions can be written as follows
a− c− (m− 1)qj +












Plugging q1 and qj into the profit functions results in the the following profits of








Proof of Proposition 2:

















m2(1 + α1)2 − 4m2α1
m2(1 + α1)2 − 4
Second, we derive the critical discount factor of an unintegrated downstream firm,
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m2(2− (m− 2)α2)2 − 8m2α2
m2(2− (m− 2)α2)2 − 16
Next, we show that maximum of the critical discount factor of the integrated down-
stream firm, δ1, and the unintegrated downstream firm, δ2, is less than the one under no











Plugging α1 = 1m into the above equation yields the following
δ1 =
m−1
m+3 < δ =
(m+1)2
(m+1)2+4m
for m > 2
We next show that δ2 at α2 =
1
m is also less than δ.
δ2 =
m−2
m+6 < δ =
(m+1)2
(m+1)2+4m
When downstream firms share the monopolistic outcome equally, the critical dis-
count factor with vertical merger is less than the one without vertical merger. This finding
is enough for us to conclude that when there are m downstream firm, vertical merger
facilitates collusion.
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Proof of Lemma 7:




























H is always the case because of the assumption
H > L. Also, observe that
(R− cH
H







From the last inequality, we conclude that λL > λH because cLL >
cH
H is the efficiency
assumption in this paper.
Now, consider the second part of (i) of Lemma 1. If λ ∈ (λH , 1], then
aoH > a
o
L ⇐⇒ aoH =
√









































H since H > L. Then, the inequality (5.1) is satisfied if
(R− cH
H







The efficiency assumption of cLL >
cH














R(H − L) + cH − cL > 0
where H > L and cH > cL. Therefore, the high quality monopolist charges higher prices
compared to the low quality monopolist.
Proof of Lemma 8:
Observe first that
ΠL(poH , a; 1) > ΠL(p
o
L, a; 0) for all λ ∈ [0, 1]
ΠL(poH , a; 1) = [
λa
1 + a
+ (1− λ)](RH − cH
2H
)(
RH + cH − 2cL
2
)− a (5.2)
ΠL(poL, a; 0) = [
λa
1 + a






The payoff in the equation (5.2) is bigger than the payoff in the equation (5.3) if















It is always the case that
(





)⇐⇒ R(H − L) + cH − cL > 0












As a result, in the inequality (5.4) both elements of the right hand side are bigger than
the elements of the left hand side. Consequently, we can conclude that ΠL(poH , a; 1) >
ΠL(poL, a; 0) for all λ ∈ [0, 1]
Now recall from Lemma 1 that if λ ∈ (λH , 1], then aoH > aoL while if λ ∈ [0, λH ],
then aoH = a
o
L = 0
Start with the region where λ ∈ [0, λH ]. Since aoH = aoL = 0 (i.e. they are equal),
the following inequality is the result of first step in this lemma.
ΠL(poH , a
o





Now, consider the region,λ ∈ (λH , 1]. One can show that ΠL(poH , aoH ; 1) > ΠL(poL, aoL; 0)
also holds with aoH > a
o
L by the following
dΠL(poH , a; 1)
da
|a=aoH> 0
This last condition means that if the low quality firm can mimic the high quality firm, it
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prefers higher level of advertising to aoL (i.e. its profit is higher at a
o
H)

















RH + cH − 2cL
2
)− 1 > 0
After some straightforward calculations, the inequality reduces to the following
(RH − 2cL + cH) > RH − cH ⇐⇒ cH > cL.
Thus, the observable quality price and advertising spending (poH , a
o
H) cannot be a
separating equilibrium. Hence, if the high quality firm is to separate, it has to distort price
and/or advertising from (poH , a
o
H). In other words, signaling issue is relevant.
Proof of Proposition 3:










+ (1− λ)](R− p
H
)(p− cL) + a]



























)(p− cL)− 1] = 0 (5.6)
∂Λ
∂µ
= ΠoL − [λ
a
1 + a
+ (1− λ)](R− p
H
)(p− cL) + a = 0 (5.7)








In order to find the equilibrium pair of pH and aH , we solve equation (5.7) and





λ(RH − cL)− 2
√
H]aH − [(1− λ)[
√





2 − (1− λ)λ
√
H] = 0
The next step is to find the available roots of this function. The roots are a1H








H for each level of
advertising a1H and a
2
H respectively.

























H) yield the same
for a mimicking low quality firm. Basically, it is required to show that ΠH(a1H , p
1
H ; 1) >
ΠH(a2H , p
2













least-cost separating equilibrium or the one survives by standard refinement (i.e., Cho and




H ; 1)−ΠH(a2H , p2H ; 1)
= [ΠH(a1H , p
1
H ; 1)−ΠH(a2H , p2H ; 1)]− [ΠL(a1H , p1H ; 1)−ΠL(a2H , p2H ; 1)]
= [cH − cL][D(a2H , p2H ; 1)−D(a1H , p1H ; 1)]
Since cH > cL, the high-quality firm gains more at (a1H , p
1
H) if demand is lower. It is
easy to show that, however, demand at (a1H , p
1











H . This equilibrium can also be called least-cost separating

























































4L . Then, the incentive compatibility
condition for low-quality firm is satisfied if
(1− λ)(R− p
H
)(p− cL) = ΠoL =







The problem reduces to find price levels psH that satisfies the equation (5.9). The
only plausible root of this function is
pHs =




where ∆1 = (RH + cL)2 − 4(RHcL +
HΠoL
1−λ ) Now, let’s check the boundary values of p
s
H




2, the incentive compatibility condition (5.9) reduces to
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Next thing to solve is that what would be the value of psH at λK . First, remember that at













where ∆ = [
√






λ(RL − cL) − 2
√








L(RH − cL) −
√
H(RL− cL)]












Now, find the optimal price from the incentive compatibility (5.9) condition of the low
quality firm







Now, lets use the equation (5.10)

































This last equation is equal to the psH(λK).
In the region of λ ∈ [0, λL], we start with analyzing the case where all consumers
are aware of the product (λ = 0). Consumers consist of only aware-type so that advertising
spending only has the role of dissipative signaling (money burning) and does not directly
enhance demand.
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The payoff function of q-quality is
Πq(p, a; ρ) = D(p, a; ρ)(p− cq)− a









H = 0 for the high-quality firm and the












2 , 0). The incentive compatibility condition for the low quality firm is as
follows





(R− pH )(p− cL)−
(RL−cL)2
4L ≤ a (ICL)
Then, by using ICL, define a function a(p) as the level of advertising required to
deter imitation by a low quality firm for a given price p. Another way to think of the
advertising decision is asking the question, how much advertising should the high-quality
firm employ just to have the incentive compatibility condition of the low-quality firm
satisfied?
a(p) = max{0, (R− pH )(p− cL)−
(RL−cL)2
4L }
It is easy to show that ΠoL =
(RL−cL)2
4L = ΠL(p; 1) = ΠL(p; 1) < ΠL(p
o
L; 1) <
ΠL(poH ; 1) < ΠL(p
H






H < p along with the values


















Even under the most favorable beliefs, the low quality firm does not mimic any price
below p and above p since corresponding profit is less than its observable quality profit.
Hence, p /∈ (p, p), advertising spending is not required to ensure separation. However, given
that price is in the region of (p, p), at least an amount a(p) of advertising has to be spent
to deter the mimicry of lower quality. Therefore, the maximization problem for the high
quality firm could be written in the following form;
max
p,a




(i) a ≥ a(p)
(ii) p ε [p, p]
The firm will choose the lowest possible advertising, a = a(p), to minimize the cost; then,
its profit and the maximization problem reduce to
ΠH(p, a; 1) =
(RH−p)(p−cH)


















p ε [p, p]
Since the payoff function of the high-quality firm increases in price, it is optimal to
increase the price to p. Also, for the region pε(0, p)
⋃
(p,∞), the price itself is enough to
ensure separation; therefore, it is again optimal to choose p. To sum up, higher quality
would price at p and does not advertise in the separating equilibrium.
For λ ∈ (0, λL], the idea of the proof is similar. The low quality firm does not mimic
the high quality.
(1− λ)(R− pHH )(pH − cL) = Π
o
L = (1− λ)
(RL−cL)2
4L ICL






Proof of Corollary 1:


















































































































As λ increases, the high quality firm’s price psH decreases.
Now, let’s turn to the second part of the Corollary, psH > p
o





follows immediately from the proof of asH < a
o
H .
































∆; hence, multiplying it with some other
positive expression is not going to affect the sign.
[
√




∆ + (cH − cL)
√
λ] = ∆− λ(cH − cL)2






We are interested in the sign of ∆− λ(cH − cL)2
∆− λ(cH − cL)2 = [
√









−4H(1− λ+ aoL)2 − 4H(1− λ)λ− λ(cH − cL)2
= [
√
λ(RH − cH)− 2
√











H(1− λ+ aoL)2 − (1− λ)λ
√
H]− λ(cH − cL)2
= [
√

















H(1− λ+ aoL)2 − (1− λ)λ
√
H]
Let’s plug aoL into the equation and multiply it by L.
∆− λ(cH − cL)2 = L[
√




















































H(RL− cL) > 0



















∆} < 0 so that asH < aoH


















In fact, we have just shown that
sign{
√
∆− (cH − cL)
√
λ} > 0.
Hence, psH > p
o
H .
Proof of Corollary 2:

















































































































(ii) If λ ∈ (λK , 1], asH − asL can be written as follows
asH − aoL =
[
√



















λ(RH − cL)− 2
√
H and B = 2
√
HaoL.


























λ(RH − cL)− 4H[(aoL)
2 + 2(1− λ)aoL + 2(1− λ)]]








⇔ A = (RL− cL)− 2
√
L




H]− 4H[(aoL)2 + 2(1− λ)aL] + 8H(1− λ)]
= A2 + 4
√
H(1− λ)A− 4H[(aoL)2 + 2(1− λ)aoL]
= [A+ 2
√
H(1− λ)]2 − 4H(1− λ)2 − 4H[aL + (1− λ)]2 + 4H(1− λ)2
= [A+ 2
√







H(1− λ)]2 − [B + 2
√
H(1− λ)]2 = (A−B)[A+B + 4
√
H(1− λ)]
∆ = (A−B)[A+B + 4
√
H(1− λ)]
Now, let’s go back to our original problem and substitute for ∆






























Proof of Proposition 4:
Let’s first calculate the high quality firm’s profit in the separating equilibrium




























































And the H-quality firm’s profit is in case of deviation from the separating equilibrium







The separating equilibrium exists if the H-quality prefers the separating equilibrium
pair to any other pair where consumer mistakenly believes that it is of a low quality firm.
ΠH(psH , a
s
H ; 1) > maxp,a ΠH(p, a; 0)
ΠH(psH , a
s




























After some algebra, the inequality reduces to the following;
ΠH(psH , a
s















The increasing marginal cost assumption (i.e., cH > cL) is necessary for the existence. The





























Let’s take the square of both sides
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L into the equa-
tion;

















This inequality is satisfied if (i) (H-L) is not too small and (2) R is not too
small.
Let’s now calculate the high quality firm’s profit at the proposed separating equi-
librium (psH , a
s
H) = (p, 0) when λ ∈ [0, λL]
ΠH(psH , a
s




= (1− λ)((RL− cL)
2
4L
− (RH − p)(cH − cL)
H
)
The following is the high quality firm’s profit when it deviates from the separating equilib-
rium. Realize that the high quality firm would not advertise in case of deviation because
λ ∈ [0, λL] i.e., even the low quality firm with lower marginal cost does not advertise.
maxp ΠH(p, 0; 0) = maxp(1− λ)(R− pL)(p− cH) = (1− λ)
(RL−cH)2
4L
The separating equilibrium exists if the the following condition is satisfied;
ΠH(psH , a
s









In what follows, we show that the following equation is satisfied if (i) (H-L) is not too small
and (2) R is not too small.
sign{H(2RL− cL − cH)− 4L(RH − p)} > 0
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Let’s substitute p = RH+cL2 +
√
(R2HL−cL2)(H−L)
4L into the last equation.









(R2HL− c2L)(H − L)− [H(cH + cL)− 2LcL]}.





(R2HL− c2L)(H − L) + [H(cH + cL)− 2LcL].
Then the inequality turns out to be;
sign{4L(R2HL− c2L)(H − L)− [H(cH + cL)− 2LcL]2}.














H − L+H(cH + cL)]}.
Finally, the separating equilibrium(psH , a
s





H − L−H(cH + cL)} > 0.
This inequality holds if (i)(H-L) is not too small (ii) R is not too small.














H − cH). In case of deviation, we have specified the off-the-equilibrium
path beliefs such that consumers believe it is of low quality. In what follows, we describe
the deviation profit of high quality

















With λ ∈ [λL, λK ], there are two separate cases: (i)asH = 0 < aLH < aoL, and (ii)aLH = asH =
0 < aoL.













































After some algebra, the inequality reduces to




λ− (1− λ)(RH − cL −
√
∆1)] ≥ 0
Case(ii): By using the previous case where λ ∈ [0, λL], it is easy to show that p > psH > pLH .
The following is the incentive compatibility condition for H-quality firm
ΠH(psH , a
s




> (1− λ)(R− p
H
)(p− cH)
> Π(pLH , a
L




However, this is the same inequality with the case where λ ∈ [0, λL]; hence, the separating
equilibrium exists if (i)(H-L) is not too small (ii) R is not too small.
No pooling equilibrium:
The proof is similar to Bagwell (2005). Before destabilization of pooling equilibria, we first
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introduce the method by Bagwell and Ramey (1988). Let’s define the demand of any firm
when the initial prior of being high-quality is ρ0
D(p, a; ρ0) = λ a1+a(R−
p
ρ0H+(1−ρ0)L) + (1− λ)(R−
p
ρ0H+(1−ρ0)L)
Let’s define the following heuristic payoff function
Π̃(p, a; c, ρ) = (p− c)D(p, a; ρ)− a
where ρ represents the probability that the firm is of high quality. In fact, there are only two
marginal cost levels: cL and cH while Π̃(p, a; c) is heuristic payoff function with marginal
costs c and demand D(p, a; 1). Let’s assume that for any given c, there exists a unique p(c)
and a(c) that maximizes the payoff function which is concave in both p and a.
γ(c) = (p(c), a(c)) =argmax
p,a
Π̃(p, a; c, 1)






H are observable quality price
and advertising spending of a high-quality firm respectively. Furthermore, let’s assume
that there exists c > cL and cL > c with the boundary condition as follows
max{ΠL(γ(c); 1),ΠL(γ(c); 1)} < ΠoL = ˜Π(γ(cL)).
In a candidate pure strategy pooling equilibrium such as (p̃, ã), let’s assume that both
type of firms play this strategy with probability one and all exposed consumers believe
that the firm is indeed a high-quality with probability ρ0. In our case, under the condition
that cL < cH and the low-quality firm is indifferent, demand reducing changes shall make
the high-quality better off as we have shown before. With cL < cH and the boundary
conditions , there exists ċ > cL that gives the following Indifference equality
(p̃− cL)D(p̃, ã; ρ0)− ã− (p(ċ)− cL)D(p(ċ), a(ċ); 1) + a(ċ) = 0
89
Here, there might be a c̈ < cL that satisfies the last equality but we prefer ċ since it induces
a profitable deviation by decreasing the demand for the high-quality firm while c̈ does the
opposite. In order to destabilize the candidate pooling equilibrium all we need is another
pair of price and advertising in which high-quality firm becomes better off while low-quality
firm is indifferent(Cho and Kreps (1987) refinement).
We also have the following inequality by construction
(p(ċ)− ċ)D(p(ċ), a(ċ); 1)− a(ċ)− (p̃− ċ)D(p̃, ã; ρ0) + ã > 0
By adding up last two equation, We drive the following inequality
(ċ− cL)[D(p̃, ã; ρ0)−D(p(ċ), a(ċ); 1)] > 0
Hence, it is a fact that D(p̃, ã; ρ0) > D(p(ċ), a(ċ); 1) since ċ > cL
The next step is to show that this pair of strategies (p(ċ), a(ċ)) makes the high-
quality firm better off compared to pooling strategy (p̃, ã). The sign of the following
equation determines whether deviation would be profitable for the high-quality firm;
(p̃− cH)D(p̃, ã; ρ0)− ã− (p(ċ)− cH)D(p(ċ), a(ċ); 1) + a(ċ)
Now, subtract the indifference equation to get
(cL − cH)[D(p̃, ã; ρ0)−D(p(ċ), a(ċ); 1)] < 0
Therefore, the high-quality firm has incentive to deviate from the candidate pooling
equilibrium pair (p̃, ã) to the pair (p(ċ), a(ċ)) and also consumers correctly believes that
this deviation is an act of high quality firm with Cho and Kreps (1987). So, no pooling
equilibria can survive under Cho and Kreps refinement.
Proof of Proposition 5:
The incentive compatibility condition of the low quality firm (ICL)is
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)(p− cL) + (1− λ)(R−
p
L
)(p− cL)− a ≤ ΠoL.
If the ICL is satisfied for the pair (poH , a
o





maximize its payoff for any value λ ∈ [0, 1]. We characterize the properties of the (psiH , asiH)
in three steps.
In the first step, we argue that at λ = 1, aforementioned maximization problem of
the high quality firm perfectly coincides with the maximization problem in Section 3. When
all consumers are unaware of the product (i.e., λ = 1), the fraction of aware consumers
is zero so that whether aware consumers have the knowledge of product quality does not












In the second step, we show that ΠoL (i.e., the RHS of ICL ) is decreasing in λ and
ΠL(poH , a
o
H ; 1) (i.e., the LHS of ICL) is increasing in λ. The optimal observable quality











if λ ∈ (λL, 1]
(RL−cL)2
4L if λ ∈ [0, λL]
.
































RH + cH − 2cL
4H
)










RH + cH − 2cL
4H
)− (R(2L−H)− cH)(
RH + cH − 2cL
4L
)








































Hence, if λ ∈ (λ∗, 1], ΠL(poH , aoH ; 1) is increasing and convex in λ. To be able to
argue that ΠL(poH , a
o
H ; 1) decreasing in whole region of λ ∈ [λH , 1], we need to show that


































)(HR+ cH) > (RH − cH)
Thus, λ∗ is always smaller than λH .
In the third step, we argue that (i) at λ = 1, ΠoL (i.e., the RHS of ICL ) is less
than ΠL(poH , a
o
H ; 1) (i.e., the LHS of ICL) (ii) at λ = λH , Π
o





At λ = 1, the maximization problem in section 3 coincides with the one we are analyzing
here. From Lemma 2, it is the case that ΠL(poH , a
o
H ; 1) > Π
o
L at λ = 1. To show part (ii),
remember that if λ ≤ λH , then aoH = aoL = 0. By definition of poL, the following inequality
is always satisfied at λ = λH
ΠL(poH , 0; 1) = (1− λ)(R−
poH
L








H ; 1) < Π
o
L if λ ∈ [0, λI)
ΠL(poH , a
o
H ; 1) = Π
o
L if λ = λI
ΠL(poH , a
o
H ; 1) > Π
o
L if λ ∈ (λI , 1]
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Thus, the high quality firm has to distort price and advertising from (poH , a
o
H) if λ ∈ (λI , 1].
For all other values of λ, it sets its optimal observable price and advertising (poH , a
o
H) and
there is no distortion.
Now, from second step, we know that ΠoL−ΠL(poH , aoH ; 1) is maximized at λ = 1 and
decreases as λ decreases. Basically, the distortion in both price and advertising is highest
when there is no informed consumer. Over time, as the fraction of informed consumers
increases, the distortion in both price and advertising decreases.
Proof of Proposition 6:
The nice property of the solution pair (psiH , a
si
H) is that the distortion decreases as λ de-
creases. In other words, if one can find the conditions under which
ΠH(psiH , a
si
H ; 1) > maxp,a ΠH(p, a; 0)
at λ = 1. Then, as the fraction of informed consumers increases, distortion decreases and
ΠH(psiH , a
si
H ; 1) increases. As a result, the existence is satisfied for all other values of λ
under the same conditions. However, the conditions under which this inequality is satisfied
at λ = 1 is already characterized in Section 3. The separating equilibrium (psiH , a
si
H) exists
if (i) (H-L) is not too small (ii) R is not too small.
Proof of Lemma 9: When θE ≤ a, i.e., pE ≤ (qE−qo)aqE , the entrant’s pricing problem is
argmax
pE














qIpI − a(qI − qE) + cEqE
2qE
BRE(pI) =
qIpI − a(qI − qE) + cEqE
2qE
When θE ≥ a, i.e., pE ≥ (qE−qo)qE , the entrant’s pricing problem is
argmax
pE





















qI(qE − qo)pI + qEcE(qI − qo)
2qE(qI − qo)
BRE(pI) =
qI(qE − qo)pI + qEcE(qI − qo)
2qE(qI − qo)
The incumbent’s pricing problem is
argmax
pI




Taking derivative of ΠI w.r.t. pI gives the incumbent’s reaction function in the following
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form
0 = b− qIpI − qEpE
qI − qE




qEpE + b(qI − qE) + cIqI
2qI
BRI(pE) =
qEpE + b(qI − qE) + cIqI
2qI
Proof of Lemma 10: The intersection of best response functions of the
incumbent and the entrant determines the equilibrium that could be in region 0,I, II, or III.
The best response function of the entrant can be written as follows
BRE(pI ) =

cE if cI ≤ pI ≤
cEqE + a(qI − qE)
qI
qIpI − a(qI − qE) + cEqE
2qE
if
cEqE + a(qI − qE)
qI
≤ pI ≤





a(qI + qE − 2qo)− cEqE
qI
≤ pI ≤
(qI − qo)[2a(qE − qo)− cEqE ]
qI (qE − qo)
qI (qE − qo)pI + qEcE(qI − qo)
2qE(qI − qo)
if
(qI − qo)[2a(qE − qo)− cEqE ]




qEpE + b(qI − qE) + cIqI
2qI
.
Region 0:(θI < a & θE < a) In this parametric region, the incumbent optimally charges
a price that even the poorest consumer prefers to buy from the incumbent and the entrant
can not capture market share even by charging its marginal cost, cE . In other words, the
indifference cutoff between the incumbent and the entrant, θI , is lower than a, even if the
entrant’s price is cE . The best response function of the entrant is BRE(pI) = cE where
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cI ≤ pI ≤
cEqE + a(qI − qE)
qI
The best response functions of the entrant and the incumbent intersect in this region if the
following condition is satisfied
cI ≤ pI ≤
a(qI − qE) + qEcE
qI
cI ≤ BRI(cE) =
qEcE + b(qI − qE) + cIqI
2qI ≤




≤ b ≤ 2a− cIqI − cEqE
qI − qE
where BRI(cE) is the incumbent’s best response at the price of cE by the entrant.
In this region, the incumbent is the only active seller in the market.
Region I:( a < θI & θE < a)
In this region, some consumers potentially may buy from the entrant and all these con-
sumers strictly prefer consuming the product of the entrant instead of consuming the out-
side good. The best response function of the entrant isBRE(pI) =
qIpI − a(qI − qE) + cEqE
2qE
where




Plugging best response function of the incumbent into the inequality induces first
condition of Region I
a(qI − qE) + qEcE
qI
< pI
a(qI − qE) + qEcE
qI
< BRI(cE) =
qEcE + b(qI − qE) + cIqI
2qI
2a− cIqI − cEqE
qI − qE
< b
The best response function of the entrant is BRE(pI) =




a(qE + qI − 2qo)− cEqE
qI
Since θE = pEqE(qE−qo) < a, the price charged by the entrant in this region is can not be
more than a(qE−qo)qE . Plugging best response function of the incumbent into the inequality
induces first condition of Region I
pI <






a(qE + qI − 2qo)− cEqE
qI
b <
2qI + qE − 3qo
qI − qE
a− cIqI − 2qEcE
qI − qE
Now by combing these two conditions, we derive the condition to have the equilib-
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rium in the Region I
2a− cIqI − cEqE
qI − qE
< b < (
2qI + qE − 3qo
qI − qE
)a− cIqI − 2qEcE
qI − qE
Region II: (θI > a & θE = a)
In this region, some consumers potentially may buy from the entrant while the poorest
consumer is indifferent between consuming the product of the entrant and consuming the
outside good. Since θE = pEqE(qE−qo) = a, the price charged by the entrant in this region is
a(qE−qo)
qE




a(qI + qE − 2qo)− cEqE
qI
≤ pI ≤
(qI − qo)[2a(qE − qo)− cEqE ]
qI(qE − qo)
Plugging best response function of the incumbent into the inequality will give us the con-
dition of Region II





) ≤ (qI − qo)[2a(qE − qo)− cEqE ]
qI(qE − qo)
(
2qI + qE − 3qo
qI − qE
)a− cIqI − 2qEcE
qI − qE
≤ b ≤ (4qI − qE − 3qo
qI − qE
)a− cIqI(qE − qo) + 2qEcE(qI − qo)
qI − qE
Region III:(θI > a & θE > a)
In this region, some consumers potentially may buy from the entrant while some of these
consumers strictly prefer buying the product of the entrant and the others prefer consuming
the outside good. Since θE = pEqE(qE−qo) > a, the price charged by the entrant in this region
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can not be less than a(qE−qo)qE . The best response function of the entrant in this region is
BRE(pI) =
qI(qE − qo)pI + qEcE(qI − qo)
2qE(qI − qo)
where
(qI − qo)[2a(qE − qo)− cEqE ]
qI(qE − qo)
≤ pI
Plugging best response function of the incumbent into the inequality induces con-
dition of Region III







4qI − qE − 3qo
qI − qE
)a− cIqI(qE − qo) + 2qEcE(qI − qo)
qI − qE
< b
Proof of Lemma 11: Given the price of the incumbent, the H-type entrant’s profit can
be written as








where pH(q̃E) and pI(q̃E) are the complete information optimal prices of the H-type entrant
and the incumbent, respectively.






−pH(qI − q̃E) + qIpI − q̃EpH
(qI − q̃E)2









Now by using Envelope Theorem, we can write down the following













Hence, we can conclude that the H-type entrant’s profit increases in its perceived quality,
q̃E .
Proof of Proposition 7: We write down the profit of the E-type entrant as







= (pE − cE)
[
qIpI(q̃E − qo)− q̃EpE(q̃I − qo)
(qI − q̃E)(q̃E − qo)
]
where E ∈ {L,H} and q̃E = ρoH + (1− ρo)L.
From Lemma 9, we know that when the perceived quality of the entrant is q̃E , the incum-
bent optimal price is
pI(q̃E) =
q̃EpE + b(qI − q̃E + cIqI)
2qI
Plugging pI(q̃E) into the profit,ΠE(q̃E , pI , cH) , of the H-type entrant results in
ΠE(q̃E , pI , cE) = (pE − cE)
[
b(qI − q̃E)(q̃E − qo) + cIqI(q̃E − qo)− q̃EpE(2qI − q̃E − qo)




Differentiating this profit function w.r.t. pE , it can be shown that




b(qI − q̃E)(q̃E − qo) + cIqI(q̃E − qo) + q̃EcE(2qI − q̃E − qo)− 2q̃EpE(2qI − q̃E − qo)




∂2ΠE(q̃E , pI , cE)
∂pE∂cE
=
q̃E(2qI − q̃E − qo)
2(qI − q̃E)(q̃E − qo)
> 0
which implies that
∂ΠH(q̃E , pI , cH)
∂pH
− ∂ΠL(q̃E , pI , cL)
∂pH
> 0
However, it is easy to see that for any values of pH ≥ p∗H , the profit of both the H-
and L-type entrant decreases. Hence, the last inequality implies that
∣∣∣∣∂ΠH(q̃E , pI , cH)∂pH
∣∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣∣∂ΠL(q̃E , pI , cL)∂pH
∣∣∣∣
When pH ≥ p∗H , both
∂ΠH(q̃E ,pI ,cH)
∂pH
and ∂ΠL(q̃E ,pI ,cL)∂pH have the negative sign, we can
conclude that
∂ΠL(q̃E , pI , cL)
∂pH
/
∂ΠH(q̃E , pI , cH)
∂pH
> 1 for any pH ≥ p∗H ,
Proof of Lemma 12:
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We first derive the profit, ΠLL of the L-type entrant. From Lemma 9, we know that
p∗L =
qIpI(qL − qo) + qLcL(qI − qo)
2qL(qI − qo)
By plugging the complete information price, p∗L, into the profit function, Π
L
L, we get the
following
ΠLL =
[qIpI(qL − qo)− qLcL(qI − qo)]2
4qL(qI − qo)(qI − qL)(qL − qo)
.
Furthermore, we rewrite ΠHL as follows
ΠHL = (pH − cL)
[
qIpI(qH − qo)− qHpH(qI − qo)
(qI − qH)(qH − qo)
]
.
The constraint optimization problem can be written in the following Lagrangian
form
Λ = ΠHH + λ1(Π
L
L −ΠHL )
= (pH − cH)
[qIpI(qH − qo)− qHpH(qI − qo)]
(qI − qH)(qH − qo)
+λ1
[
[qIpI(qL − qo)− qLcL(qI − qo)]2
4qL(qI − qo)(qI − qL)(qL − qo)
− (pH − cL)
[qIpI(qH − qo)− qHpH(qI − qo)]
(qI − qH)(qH − qo)
]
The first-order conditions can be written as follows
∂Λ
∂pH
= qIpI(qH − qo)(1 + λ1)− 2qHpH(qI − qo)(1 + λ1) + qH(qI − qo)(cH + cLλ1) = 0
∂Λ
∂λ1







, pH ≥ 0, λ1 ≤ 0
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The constraint of this optimization problem is binding due to focus on the least-cost sep-
arating equilibrium, i.e., λ1 < 0. Hence, solving pH from the ∂Λ∂pH equation leads to
pQSH =
qIpI(qH − qo)(1 + λ1) + qLcL(qI − qo)(cH + cLλ1)
2qH(qI − qo)(1 + λ1)
In order to guarantee that this is indeed the separating price which maximizes the
H-type entrant profit, the following second order condition has to be satisfied
∂2Λ
∂p2H
= −2qH(qI − qo)(1 + λ1) < 0
λ1 > −1
Now, we substitute pQSH into
∂Λ
∂λ1
equation above to derive the value of λ1
[
qIpI(qH − qo)(1 + λ1) + qH(qI − qo)(cH − cL)(2 + λ1)
2qH(qI − qo)(1 + λ1)
] [
qIpI(qH − qo)(1 + λ1)− qH(qI − qo)(cH + cLλ1)
2(1 + λ1)
]
−(qI − qH)(qH − qo)ΠLL = 0
Now, by substituting x = qIpI(qH − qo), y = qH(qI − qo), and z = 4(qI − qo)(qI − qH)(qH −
qo)ΠLL, the equation reduces to following one
0 = (x2 − z)(1 + λ1)2 − 2xy(1 + λ1)2cL − y2 [cH − cL(2 + λ1)] (cH + cLλ1)
0 = (x2 − 2xycL + y2c2L − z)λ21 + 2(x2 − 2xycL + y2c2L − z)λ1
+ (x2 − 2xycL − z)− y2(cH − 2cL)cH
0 =
[








(x− ycL)2 − z
]
− y2(cH − cL)2
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We can rewrite the last equation in the form of aλ21 +bλ1 +c = 0 where a = [(x−ycL)2−z],




















= −1+ y(cH − cL)√
(x− ycL)2 − z
Since the second order condition requires that λ1 > −1, the only plausible root is the
following one
λ1 = −1 +
y(cH − cL)√
(x− ycL)2 − z
λ1 = −1 +
qH(qI − qo)(cH − cL)√
[qIpI(qH − qo)− qH(qI − qo)cL]2 − 4qH(qI − qo)(qI − qH)(qH − qo)ΠLL
where we first plug a, c and then x, y, and z into the equation(s).
Proof of Lemma 13: Given the price of the H-type entrant, the incumbent’s profit can
be written as






where pH(q̃E) and pI(q̃E) are the complete information optimal prices of the H-type entrant
and the incumbent, respectively.





= −−pH(qI − q̃E) + qIpI − q̃EpH
(qI − q̃E)2
= −qI(pI − pH)
(qI − q̃E)2
< 0
Now by using Envelope Theorem, we can write down the following













Hence, we can conclude that the incumbent’s profit decreases in the entrant’s perceived
quality, q̃E .
Proof of Lemma 14:
Due to the complementarity between the entrant’s and the incumbent’s pricing strategies,
the price of entrant increases as the price of the incumbent increases. We need to show
that as the price of the high quality entrant increases, the ratio of the marginal profit of
the low type entrant over the marginal profit of the high cost entrant decreases. In other































2q̃2E(cH − cL)(2qI − q̃E − qo)
[b(qI − q̃E)(q̃E − qo) + cIqI(q̃E − qo) + (q̃EcH − 2q̃EpH)(2qI − q̃E − qo)]2
< 0
Therefore, the high type entrant’s ability to separate decreases as the price of the
incumbent increases.
Proof of Lemma 15:
The following profit function denotes the profit of the low quality entrant when it is per-
ceived as an average (ρo) quality.




qIpI(q̃E − qo)− q̃Ep∗H(qI − qo)
(qI − q̃E)(q̃E − qo)
]
The following profit function denotes the profit of the low quality entrant when it is per-





qIpI(q̃E − qo)− q̃Ep∗L(qI − qo)
(qI − qL)(qL − qo)
]
In the next equation, we analyze whether the increasing price of incumbent, pI , increases














p∗H(qI − qL)− p∗L(qI − q̃E)− cL(qI − qL − qI + q̃E)
(qI − q̃E)(qI − qL)
]
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